Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion by Siegel, Neil S.
FEDERALISM AS A WAY STATION: 
WINDSOR AS EXEMPLAR OF DOCTRINE IN MOTION 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2014) 
 
Neil S. Siegel
*
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article asks what the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. 
Windsor stands for.  It first shows that the opinion leans in the direction of 
marriage equality but ultimately resists any dispositive “equality” or 
“federalism” interpretation.  The Article next examines why the opinion 
seems intended to preserve for itself a Delphic obscurity.  The Article reads 
Windsor as an exemplar of what judicial opinions may look like in transition 
periods, when a Bickelian Court seeks to invite, not end, a national 
conversation, and to nudge it in a certain direction.  In such times, federalism 
reasoning and rhetoric—like declining to announce the level of scrutiny and 
appearing to misapply the justiciability doctrines—may be used as a way 
station toward a particular later resolution. 
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FEDERALISM AS A WAY STATION: 
WINDSOR AS EXEMPLAR OF DOCTRINE IN MOTION 
 
Some might conclude that this loaf could have used a while 
longer in the oven. But that would be wrong; it is already 
overcooked. The most expert care in preparation cannot 
redeem a bad recipe. The sum of all the Court’s nonspecific 
hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-
protection grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process 
grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous federalism 
component playing a role) because it is motivated by a “‘bare 
... desire to harm’” couples in same-sex marriages.1 
 
[Y]ou promised us bread, and you have given us a stone; you 
promised us a fish, and you have given us a serpent; we 
thought you had given us a substantial right; and you have 
given us the most evanescent shadow and delusion.
2
   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2013 decision in United 
States v. Windsor (133 S. Ct. 2675), the United States is bursting at the 
seams with litigation directly or indirectly challenging the authority of states 
to prohibit same-sex marriage.
3
  The federal and state courts that are 
responsible for adjudicating those challenges are poring over Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor.4  Given the pace of the 
litigation, the Court may again need to confront the issue of marriage 
equality sooner rather than later—and sooner than the Justices themselves 
may prefer.  When the question does return to the Court, the meaning and 
implications of the Court’s opinion in Windsor will be front and center. 
                                                 
1 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. at 2693). 
2 Robert W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas and the South, 33 J. SOUTH. HIST. 26, 37 (1967) 
(quoting criticism of Stephen Douglas by a Southerner who ultimately felt deceived by his ambiguous 
championing of “popular sovereignty” as the best solution to the problem of slavery in the territories). 
3 See Lawsuits, MarriageEqualityUSA, http://www.marriageequality.org/lawsuits (updated Feb. 3, 
2014) (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (describing federal and state lawsuits in forty-two states and DC).  See 
also Lyle Denniston, Nevada ends defense of marriage ban (UPDATED), SCOTUSblog (Feb. 11, 
2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/nevada-ends-defense-of-marriage-ban/  (“The 
controversy is one of the hottest topics being tested in federal courts, with nearly four dozen cases now 
unfolding around the country.”). 
4 See, e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, slip op. at 11 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) 
(“[T]he focus of the Court’s attention must be upon Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor.”). 
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Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (Pub. L. No. 
104-199, §3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)) amended the Dictionary Act to define 
the terms “marriage” and “spouse” for all purposes under federal law as 
“only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife” 
(1 U.S.C. § 7, i).  DOMA’s definition of marriage controlled 1,138 federal 
statutes.
5
  Their subject matters ran the gamut from estates, healthcare, 
bankruptcy, Social Security, and taxation to housing, copyright, criminality, 
and veteran’s benefits (see Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694). DOMA’s financial 
and expressive impacts on same-sex couples were substantial.
6
 
For example, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer had been in a committed 
relationship since 1963 (see Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683). Forty-four years 
later, they were living in New York, which recognized same-sex marriages 
performed elsewhere but which would not itself legalize same-sex marriage 
for another four years (id. 2683, 2689 (citing Marriage Equality Act, 2011 
N.Y. Laws 749 (codified at N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law Ann. §§ 10–a, 10–b, 13 
(West 2013))).  Worried about Spyer’s health, Windsor and Spyer married in 
Ontario, Canada, and returned home to New York City (id. 2683).  When 
Spyer died in February of 2009 and left Windsor all that she had, DOMA 
precluded Windsor from claiming the marital exemption from the federal 
estate tax.
7
  As a result, she had to pay $363,053 in estate taxes that she 
would not have had to pay but for Section 3 of DOMA (see Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2683).  After seeking and being denied a refund, she brought suit in the 
now-historic case that bears her name (id.). 
In Windsor, the Court held that Section 3 violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment (id. 2675).  While that much was clear, the 
dissenting Justices disagreed among themselves about why the Court had 
found a constitutional violation.  On one side, the dissent of Chief Justice 
Roberts seemed like an exercise in damage control.  On the other side, the 
dissent of Justice Scalia, like his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas,
8
 declared that 
the sky is falling for those seeking to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. 
                                                 
5 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO 
PRIOR REPORT 1 (2004) (identifying 1,138 federal statutes that depend upon marital status or in which 
marital status is a consideration). 
6 The First Circuit wrote that the law “prevents same-sex married couples from filing joint federal 
tax returns, which can lessen tax burdens, and prevents the surviving spouse of a same-sex marriage 
from collecting Social Security survivor benefits,” and “leaves federal employees unable to share their 
health insurance and certain other medical benefits with same-sex spouses.”  Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 
7 See 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (excluding from federal taxation “any interest in property which passes 
or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse”). 
8 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of 
homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with 
the decisions of this Court.”). 
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Roberts read Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion as turning on 
“federalism.”  More precisely, he asserted that the Court invalidated Section 
3 of DOMA because it inferred animus from Congress’s extraordinary 
intrusion into a key area of state “domestic relations” law—specifically, legal 
determinations of who may marry whom (Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696-97 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).  Roberts focused exclusively on the Court’s 
references to what might be called “extraordinary” evidence of congressional 
animus—extraordinary because of the nature of the evidence (federal 
overreach) used to infer the presence of animus.  Ignoring the many 
references in the majority opinion to the equality, liberty and dignity of 
same-sex couples and their children, Roberts insisted that the majority 
opinion did not threaten the authority of states to prohibit same-sex marriage.  
On the contrary, he deemed it “undeniable that its judgment is based on 
federalism” (id. 2697). Some commentators, including some proponents of 
same-sex marriage, are reading Windsor similarly.
9
  
By contrast, Scalia featured the Court’s emphasis on what might be 
called “ordinary” evidence of animus—that is, evidence that did not turn on 
an inference from federal overreach.  Mostly dismissing the Court’s 
references to state domestic relations law, he underscored the majority’s 
claims that “the supporters of this Act acted with malice—with the ‘purpose’ 
‘to disparage and to injure’ same-sex couples,” and that “the motivation for 
DOMA was to ‘demean,’ to ‘impose inequality,’ to ‘impose . . . a stigma,’ to 
deny ‘equal dignity,’ to brand gay people as ‘unworthy,’ and to ‘humiliat[e] 
their children’” (Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
majority opinion)).  Likewise, many commentators are reading the majority 
opinion as turning on ordinary evidence of animus against same-sex couples, 
not on anything concerning federal-state relations.
10
   
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision, SCOTUSblog 
(Jun. 26, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalism-marries-liberty-in-the-
doma-decision/ (“In short, under Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, it is the fact that states have recognized 
same-sex marriage that gives rise to heightened judicial scrutiny.”); Eric Restuccia & Aaron 
Lindstrom, Federalism and the Authority of the States To Define Marriage, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 27, 
2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalism-and-the-authority-of-the-states-to-
define-marriage/ (“[T]he principles in Windsor of respect for state sovereignty and the authority of the 
people of the states to define marriage support the conclusion that the Court will affirm the 
constitutionality of those states that have reaffirmed the historic understanding of marriage – the union 
of one man and one woman.”); Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality 
in United States v. Windsor, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117, 119 (concluding that federalism 
“played a critical role” in the Court’s opinion). 
10 See, e.g., PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR, & REVA B. 
SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 355 (5th ed. 2006 & 
Supp. 2013) (asking whether Windsor is an instance of “faux federalism” and whether “same-sex 
relationships would lack either sufficient dignity or sufficient constitutional protection if states had not 
recognized them”); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay 
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (reading Windsor as holding that “discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation violates equal protection when it reflects or reinforces ‘historical prejudice 
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This Article asks what the Court’s opinion in Windsor stands for.  In 
contrast to the many full-throated “federalism” or “equality” readings of the 
majority opinion, the Article finds that the opinion exemplifies a more 
general phenomenon, one that is easily overlooked or misunderstood, but that 
becomes apparent once doctrine is understood as moving in history rather 
than as being fully worked out at a particular point in time.  Windsor is an 
exemplar of doctrine in motion during a period of social and legal transition.  
In addition to articulating well-established equal protection reasoning about 
the purposes, effects, and dominant social meaning of DOMA, the majority 
opinion uses federalism reasoning and rhetoric both to temporize and to 
facilitate constitutional change in the direction of marriage equality.   
The Article begins by examining whether, as Roberts insisted, the 
majority opinion turns decisively on extraordinary evidence of congressional 
animus against same-sex couples.
11
  The Article shows that this reading can 
account for much of the Court’s language.  Time and again Kennedy stressed 
that New York had elected to confer dignity upon same-sex couples by 
allowing them to marry, and that DOMA discriminated against lawfully 
married same-sex couples.
12
 
Even so, the Article shows that the opinion as a whole cannot 
persuasively be read as turning dispositively on extraordinary evidence of 
animus.  Kennedy invoked key equal protection precedents that had nothing 
                                                                                                                             
and stereotyp[es]’—particularly the longstanding and widespread stereotype that sexual minorities 
constitute a threat to children and families”) (quoting Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 
2009)); Deborah Hellman, Scalia Is Right: Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor Doesn’t Rest on 
Federalism, BALKINIZATION (June 27, 2013, 5:29 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/normal-0-
false-false-false-en-us-x-none.html (“DOMA [according to the Windsor Court] expresses that gay 
couples are second-class citizens.”); Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and 
Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 141 (2013) (“Justice Kennedy’s Windsor opinion relied 
mainly on the assertion that DOMA was motivated by a simple desire to disparage and demean gays 
and lesbians.”); Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to Harm,” 
64 CASE WES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (examining “[t]he equal protection analysis upon which the 
Court relied” and deeming its federalism language a distraction); Michael McConnell, Debating the 
Court’s Gay Marriage Decisions, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jun. 26, 2013, available at 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113646/supreme-court-strikes-down-doma-dismisses-prop-8-
debate# (“Justice Kennedy has sought to find a formula that enables him to invalidate the denial of 
same-sex marriage at the national level without doing so in every state.  Federalism would have 
provided such a path, but he did not take it.”); Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 219, 220 (2013) (reading Windsor as doctrinally an equal protection case but 
“conceptually . . . a right-to-marry case”); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: 
Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 90 (2013) (observing that “Windsor endeavors to give voice to 
perspectives of the minority, the historically excluded group, in ways the affirmative action opinions 
do not,” and so “is an equality opinion unlike any the Court has handed down in quite some time”). 
11 Stated precisely, the majority opinion turns decisively on extraordinary evidence of animus if, 
but only if, the presence of such animus is necessary to the Court’s invalidation of Section 3. 
12 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (“Here the State’s decision to give this class of persons 
the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.”). 
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to do with extraordinary evidence of animus,
13
 and he emphasized DOMA’s 
demeaning purposes and effects.
14
  Critically, in concluding that DOMA was 
motivated by animus, he did not rely only on the “federalism” concerns 
featured by Roberts—that is, on DOMA’s “reach and extent” (id. at 2692). 
Instead, he also rested on considerations that appear to render DOMA 
indistinguishable from many, if not all, state denials of marriage equality:  
DOMA’s legislative history, title, effects, and social meanings—assessed 
from the perspective of same-sex couples.
15
  In light of those aspects of the 
opinion, it seems logically unnecessary and less than fully convincing to 
insist that the equal protection principles articulated by the Court in Windsor 
safeguard same-sex marriages from governmental discrimination, but do not 
protect intimate same-sex relationships from discrimination.
16
  Notably, 
Kennedy underscored only the efforts of New York and a minority of other 
states to confer equal dignity upon same-sex couples who “long[] to 
marry”;17 he did not similarly celebrate the choices of the majority of states 
to prohibit same-sex marriage.  The equality reasoning and rhetoric of the 
Windsor majority render it unlikely that the Court would have upheld 
Proposition 8 in Hollingsworth v. Perry (133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)) had it 
reached the merits in that case, as Justice Kennedy appeared to vote to do.
18
  
Accordingly, this Article concludes that the majority opinion in Windsor 
is better read as turning on ordinary evidence of animus, as Scalia insisted, 
not on extraordinary evidence of animus, as Roberts maintained.  And yet, 
there are limits to the explanatory power of Scalia’s interpretation.  The 
language stressing DOMA’s breadth and the states’ traditional power to 
regulate marriage is there in the majority opinion, and squinting does not 
make it go away.  Its being there leaves room for opponents of same-sex 
                                                 
13 See id. at 2693 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 
413 U.S. 528 (1973), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
14 See id. at 2695 (writing that “the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to 
demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage,” and that “[t]his requires the Court to 
hold, as it now does, that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person 
protected by the Fifth Amendment”).  
15 See id. at 2693; infra notes 40-41 (quoting DOMA’s legislative history); infra Part II (analyzing 
the Court’s emphasis on the effects and social meanings of DOMA). 
16 This Article focuses on the equality reasoning and rhetoric in the Court’s opinion because the 
opinion takes more of an equality perspective than a liberty perspective, even though Justice Kennedy 
also blended in liberty themes.  See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (“DOMA singles out a class of 
persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty.”).   
17 Id. at 2689 (“When at first Windsor and Spyer longed to marry, neither New York nor any other 
State granted them that right.”). 
18 The Court held 5-4 that the official supporters of Proposition 8 lacked standing to appeal the 
district court’s invalidation of the proposition.  Justices Kennedy, Sotomayor, Thomas, and Alito 
dissented; they apparently would have reached the merits.  By contrast, three members of the Windsor 
majority—Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan—voted not to reach the merits in Hollingsworth.  For 
an analysis of the possible meaning of that voting alignment, see infra Part III.D. 
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marriage to argue that the constitutional protections afforded same-sex 
marriages are greater than the protections afforded same-sex relationships. 
The Court employed another, more familiar mechanism to leave open the 
possibility that some state bans on same-sex marriage will survive judicial 
review.  Unlike other courts that have invalidated discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation,
19
 the Windsor Court declined to announce that it was 
applying heightened scrutiny.  It instead chose to talk the talk of rational 
basis review,
20
 even as it applied what might be called rational basis “double-
plus.”  In that way, too, the Court did not formally commit itself and other 
courts to invalidating all state bans on same-sex marriage.  Overall, the 
majority opinion defies decisive interpretation.  Indeed, the opinion appears 
designed to defeat domestication by disciplined legal analysis; even as it 
points in the direction of marriage equality, it seems to insist on preserving 
for itself a certain Delphic obscurity. 
This Article seeks to understand why the majority opinion is written that 
way.  It does so by examining three federalism “moves” in the opinion that 
seem especially perplexing.  First, why did the Court invoke state control of 
domestic relations in order to qualify its strong endorsement of the equal 
dignity of same-sex couples?  Second, why was the Court highly selective in 
using legal developments at the state level in the service of living 
constitutionalism, stressing only the actions of a minority of states to allow 
same-sex marriage?  Third, why did the Court, for the first time, use 
concerns about federal overreach into the area of state domestic relations law 
as—and only as—extraordinary evidence of unconstitutional animus, even 
though it seemed unnecessary and unconvincing to do so?   
The Article suggests that those aspects of the Court’s opinion are best 
approached dynamically, not statically.  Windsor is what doctrine may look 
like in times of transition, when the country is in flux and the Court wants to 
nudge a national conversation in a certain direction rather than end it.  In 
such periods—whether 1850s debates over “popular sovereignty”21 in the 
territories or current debates over same-sex marriage—the analytical and 
rhetorical resources of federalism may be used as a way station toward a 
particular later resolution.   
                                                 
19 See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 2014 WL 211807, slip op. at 9 (9th Cir. 
Jan. 21, 2014 (heightened scrutiny); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 176 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(intermediate scrutiny); Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 U.S. 1, 11 (1st  Cir. 2012) 
(more searching scrutiny than rational basis); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N. W. 2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009) (at 
least intermediate scrutiny); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P. 3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008) (strict scrutiny); 
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 477 (Conn. 2008) (at least intermediate scrutiny). 
20 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage 
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”). 
21 See supra note 2; infra Part III.C (discussing Stephen Douglas’s use of federalism rhetoric in 
championing popular sovereignty as the proper solution to the problem of slavery in the territories). 
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The Windsor Court’s various invocations of federalism are not 
attributable simply to Justice Kennedy’s idiosyncratic ways of expressing his 
commitment to limited federal power and to residual state authority, or to his 
potential ambivalence about same-sex marriage.  Indeed, the voting 
alignment in Hollingsworth v. Perry raises the possibility that Kennedy is no 
longer the median Justice regarding the constitutional rights of same-sex 
couples.  Rather, the Windsor Court’s uses of federalism are probably best 
understood as reflecting a statesmanlike effort to encourage but not to coerce 
for the time being—to allow continued deliberation and litigation over same-
sex marriage in the states, and to move that deliberation toward greater 
equality for same-sex couples and their children.  
The Court’s uses of federalism rhetoric as a way station thus share certain 
similarities with its failure to announce the level of scrutiny in select equal 
protection cases and its apparent misapplication of justiciability doctrines.
22
  
As just noted, the Windsor majority itself implausibly declared that Section 3 
of DOMA flunked rational basis review.  And as explored below,
23
 certain 
Justices in the Windsor majority may have responded to prudential concerns 
in Hollingsworth.  The phenomenon identified by this Article is limited 
neither to Windsor nor to federalism.  The Court’s federalism approach in 
Windsor, however, may result in a stronger nudge than may the use of other 
techniques. 
Part I presents the Chief Justice’s reading of the majority opinion in 
Windsor as turning on extraordinary evidence of animus.  Part II argues that 
the opinion is better viewed as turning on ordinary evidence of animus, but 
that such a reading itself has limited explanatory power.  Part III explores the 
Windsor Court’s reliance on federalism as a way station, and compares that 
reliance to certain other judicial techniques.  Part IV anticipates objections to 
the reading of Windsor offered here, and the Conclusion identifies a lesson of 
that reading.  It is a lesson about the under-appreciated but potentially potent 
role of federalism reasoning and rhetoric as both a Bickelian passive virtue 
and a catalyst in managing the processes of constitutional change.
24
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 See infra Part III.C (discussing different methods that the Court may employ during transitional 
periods to manage constitutional change). 
23 See infra Part III.D (analyzing the responses of the Justices in the Windsor majority to the 
standing question in Hollingsworth v. Perry). 
24 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962) (advocating that the Court deploy “the passive virtues” in order to 
protect legal principles from being warped by the need to maintain public legitimacy). 
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I. WINDSOR AS A CASE ABOUT “EXTRAORDINARY”  
EVIDENCE OF ANIMUS 
 
The majority opinion in Windsor includes claims about the vertical 
constitutional structure that require careful consideration.  For example, 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the “‘regulation of domestic 
relations’” is “‘an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive 
province of the States’” (Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975))).  He further wrote that the “recognition of civil 
marriages is central to state domestic relations law applicable to its residents 
and citizens” (id.), and that “the Federal Government, through our history, 
has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations” 
(id.).  He characterized DOMA as “reject[ing] the long-established precept 
that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all 
married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to 
constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next” (id. at 2692).  “DOMA, 
because of its reach and extent,” he continued, “departs from this history and 
tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage” (id.).  He stressed that 
this departure raised concerns about a possible violation of constitutional 
rights, stating that “discriminations of an unusual character especially 
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the 
constitutional provision.”25  Chief Justice Roberts focused exclusively on 
such utterances from the Court in deeming it “undeniable that its judgment is 
based on federalism” (id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). 
Because the Chief Justice’s reference to “federalism” might mean many 
things, it is important to be precise about how he was reading the majority 
opinion.  “Federalism,” Judith Resnik observes, is “a capacious term not 
obviously pre-judging where power resides.”26  And yet, “claims asserted in 
the name of federalism” are often “the shorthand for an argument that 
authority reside[s] with the subunit” (id.).  That is what Chief Justice Roberts 
meant when he wrote that the Court’s opinion was clearly “based on 
federalism.”    
Even as shorthand for privileging the authority of the states, a decision 
turning on “federalism” might still mean many things.  It could mean, for 
example, a holding that a federal law violates the Tenth Amendment by 
commandeering state legislative or executive officials (see New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997)).  It could also mean a holding that a federal law is beyond the scope 
                                                 
25 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) 
(quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928))). 
26 Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing 
Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in NOMOS LV 375 (2014). 
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of Congress’s enumerated powers.  Roberts plainly was not referring to a 
commandeering problem.  And while several federalism scholars argued that 
Section 3 was beyond the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause and was 
“an unconstitutional and unprecedented incursion into the States’ police 
powers,”27 that possible (albeit unlikely) holding did not attract any votes.  
The Court expressly stated that “it is unnecessary to decide whether this 
federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it 
disrupts the federal balance.”28   
In characterizing the Court’s holding as “undeniabl[y] . . . based on 
federalism” (id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)), Roberts meant 
something else.  “The dominant theme of the majority opinion,” he wrote, “is 
that the Federal Government’s intrusion into an area ‘central to state 
domestic relations law applicable to its residents and citizens’ is sufficiently 
‘unusual’ to set off alarm bells” (id. 2697 (quoting majority opinion)).  On 
that interpretation of the Court’s opinion, Section 3’s extraordinary departure 
from the traditional division of regulatory authority between the federal 
government and the states indicated that the law was motivated by animus 
against gay people.  In a similar vein, Justice Alito read the majority opinion 
as invalidating Section 3 in part for “encroach[ing] upon the States’ 
sovereign prerogative to define marriage” (id. 2719 (Alito, J., dissenting))—
for “impos[ing] a disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status 
the State finds to be dignified and proper” (id. at 2720 (quoting Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. at 2695-96 (emphasis added))).  Much of Justice Kennedy’s language 
seemed to criticize DOMA for invidiously undermining the state’s agency as 
a dignity-conferring subject, not necessarily for violating constitutionally 
protected dignity regardless of any state’s view of the matter.29  “Here the 
State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry,” he wrote, 
“conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import” (id. at 2692). 
Reading Windsor as a case about extraordinary evidence of congressional 
animus—extraordinary because of the nature of the evidence (federal 
                                                 
27 See Brief for Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, United States v. 
Windsor 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), at 3.  Consistent with the focus of the question 
presented on equal protection, the brief argued that an enumerated powers analysis of Section 3 was 
directly relevant to the equal protection inquiry.  The brief represents the views of Jonathan Adler, 
Lynn Baker, Randy Barnett, Dale Carpenter, Ilya Somin, and Ernest Young.  It should be noted that 
many, if not all, of these scholars are in favor of same-sex marriage, as are the lawyers who worked on 
the brief: Roy Englert, Carina Cuellar, and Erin Blondel.  It is therefore incorrect to assert that only 
people who were interested in “damage control” made federalism arguments against Section 3 of 
DOMA.  But from the perspective of those who believe that state bans on same-sex marriage violate 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Roberts reading of the majority opinion was a cost of attacking 
Section 3 on federalism grounds. 
28 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.  As documented in Part II.B, the majority opinion was relatively 
nationalist in describing the general scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
29 See, e.g., id. at 2695 (stating that DOMA “singles out a class of persons deemed by a State 
entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty”). 
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overreach) used to infer the presence of animus—limits the Court’s 
reasoning to federal legislation that restricts marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.  So understood, the Court’s ruling either has no implications for the 
constitutionality of state prohibitions on same-sex marriage, or else it implies 
the validity of such prohibitions.  If the state is the relevant constitutional 
subject, then perhaps it may choose to deny dignity, just as it may choose to 
confer it.  Or perhaps it may act upon an understanding of dignity that is 
different from the prevailing conception in states that permit same-sex 
marriage.  “[W]hile ‘[t]he State’s power in defining the marital relation is of 
central relevance’ to the majority’s decision to strike down DOMA here,” 
Roberts advised, “that power will come into play on the other side of the 
board in future cases about the constitutionality of state marriage definitions” 
(id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).  “So too,” he insisted, “will the 
concerns for state diversity and sovereignty that weigh against DOMA’s 
constitutionality in this case” (id.).  Roberts seemed eager to encourage a 
narrow reading of Windsor.  To reiterate, he deemed it not just correct on 
balance, but “undeniable” that the Court’s “judgment is based on federalism” 
(id.). 
In the wake of the Court’s decision, some commentators have likewise 
interpreted Windsor as authority for the constitutionality of state bans on 
same-sex marriage, or at least as no authority for their invalidity.
30
  Consider, 
for example, the interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s opinion offered by 
Randy Barnett just after the Court handed down its decision.  Barnett opined 
that the Court had selected a different means to the same end of limiting its 
holding to DOMA:  “under Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, it is the fact that 
states have recognized same-sex marriage that gives rise to heightened 
judicial scrutiny.”31  “In essence,” Barnett wrote, “state law is being used to 
identify a protected liberty or right within its borders against a federal 
statute,” meaning that the Court’s opinion “both relied on and preserved the 
states’ prerogatives to define and protect liberty.”32  That view has the same 
consequences (although not necessarily the same intent) as the Chief 
Justice’s emphasis on extraordinary evidence of animus:  Windsor is not 
authority for heightened judicial scrutiny of state laws excluding same-sex 
couples from the institution of marriage.  “By adopting this federalism 
approach to identifying protected liberty,” Barnett concluded, “states remain 
free to continue deciding the marriage question” (id.), for “the logic of 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., supra note 9 (citing examples). 
31 Barnett, supra note 9.  See Young & Blondel, supra note 9, at 119 (“Federalism principles 
played a critical role in defining the contours of the equality right at stake, limiting which 
governmental interests could weigh against that right, and influencing the level of deference that the 
Court owed to how Congress had weighed those rights and interests.”). 
32 Barnett, supra note 9. 
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today’s opinion implicitly turns on the absence of any articulated federal 
interest in disregarding state laws defining marriage” (id.). 
Barnett read the Court’s opinion as analytically akin to Judge Boudin’s 
opinion for the First Circuit invalidating Section 3 of DOMA, an opinion that 
Barnett quoted (id.).  Boudin’s analysis turned substantially on concerns 
about federal overreach, even as his court held that Section 3 violated equal 
protection principles (see Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012).  Specifically, he expressly raised the level of 
equal protection scrutiny based in part on the concern that “DOMA intrudes 
extensively into a realm that has from the start of the nation been primarily 
confided to state regulation” (id. 12).  “Given that DOMA intrudes broadly 
into an area of traditional state regulation,” he wrote, “a closer examination 
of the justifications that would prevent DOMA from violating equal 
protection (and thus from exceeding federal authority) is uniquely reinforced 
by federalism concerns.”33 
Is a “federalism” reading of Windsor truly “undeniable,” as the Chief 
Justice insisted?  Is it even the best reading available?  Talk of “the best 
reading” raises the question of the meaning of “best.”  Likewise, talk of “the 
meaning of Windsor” raises the question of the meaning of “meaning.”  This 
Article is not interested in predicting how a future Court, however 
(re)constituted, ultimately will decide the constitutionality of state bans on 
same-sex marriage.  Nor is the Article following Ronald Dworkin by 
interpreting the majority opinion in Windsor to be the best it can be in light 
of the Article’s general view of the practice of constitutional adjudication.34    
Instead, the Article asks which potential reading of Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion is most persuasive from the standpoint of the likely collective intent 
of the members of the majority coalition.  To be sure, the Windsor majority is 
a “they,” not an “it,” and the potential difficulty of discerning the collective 
intent of a group is well known.
35
  But the small number of people at issue 
may ameliorate that problem, and the absence of concurring opinions may 
suggest a coalition whose members are generally moving together once they 
decide to reach the merits.
36
  Assuming Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
                                                 
33 Id. at 14.  See id. at 15 (“[I]f we are right that in thinking that disparate impact on minority 
interests and federalism concerns both require somewhat more in this case than almost automatic 
deference to Congress’ will, this statute fails that test.”). 
34 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 52 (1986) (“[C]onstructive interpretation is a matter of 
imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form 
or genre to which it is taken to belong.”); id. at 90 (“[C]onstructive interpretations . . . try to show legal 
practice as a whole in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the 
best justification of that practice.”). 
35 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 214-15 (1980).  
36 Those five Justices obviously were not moving together regarding whether to reach the merits 
in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).  For a discussion, see infra Part III.D. 
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Sotomayor, and Kagan are all still serving when the issue of marriage 
equality returns to the Court, their likely collective intent in Windsor may 
provide the best basis for predicting whether they will invalidate state bans 
on same-sex marriage.  In the meantime, the issue of Windsor’s meaning, as 
this Article has just defined the issue, is directly relevant to the lower courts 
charged with adjudicating marriage equality litigation. 
From the standpoint of the shared intent of the author and joiners, did 
extraordinary evidence of congressional animus in the face of New York’s 
decision to recognize same-sex marriage play a key role in the Court’s de 
facto—though not de jure—decision to raise the level of scrutiny that it 
applied to Section 3?  One can be forgiven for drawing such a conclusion 
based on much of Justice Kennedy’s language.37  But such a reading fails to 
consider key features of the Court’s reasoning and rhetoric.  There is a more 
persuasive reading of the majority opinion in Windsor, a reading that is more 
expansive in its approach to constitutional equality.  The next Part develops 
that reading and identifies its limits. 
 
II. WINDSOR AS A CASE ABOUT “ORDINARY” EVIDENCE OF ANIMUS 
 
A. Equality Talk 
 
To see the limits of the Chief Justice’s reading of the majority opinion, a 
good place to begin is with Justice Scalia’s dissent:  
[T]he majority says that the supporters of this Act acted with 
malice—with the “purpose” “to disparage and to injure” 
same-sex couples. It says that the motivation for DOMA was 
to “demean,” to “impose inequality,” to “impose . . . a 
stigma,” to deny “equal dignity,” to brand gay people as 
“unworthy,” and to “humiliat[e] their children.” (Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. at 2675, 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
majority opinion)).  
Scalia, as analytically sharp and colorful as ever, wrote that “the real 
rationale of today’s opinion, whatever disappearing trail of its legalistic 
argle-bargle one chooses to follow, is that DOMA is motivated by “‘bare . . . 
desire to harm’” couples in same-sex marriages” (id. 2709).  He added:  
“How easy it is, indeed how inevitable, to reach the same conclusion with 
regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status” (id.).  In short, 
Scalia read the majority opinion as turning on the conclusion that DOMA 
reflected animus against gay people in the form of moral disapproval of 
                                                 
37 For an account of why the state-regarding language is in the Court’s opinion and why the Court 
declined to announce a level of scrutiny, see infra Parts III.C and III.D. 
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homosexuality.  In his view, the opinion did not turn on anything having to 
do with federalism, including animus evidenced decisively by an 
extraordinary federal intrusion into state domestic relations law.
38
  
Substantial evidence supports Justice Scalia’s reading.  For example, the 
Court justified its invalidation of Section 3 in substantial part by pointing to 
conventional evidence of an unconstitutional legislative purpose—namely, 
the legislative history and the title of the statute.
39
  In the Court’s view, “[t]he 
history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate” that the 
statute’s “essence” was “interference with the equal dignity of same-sex 
marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign 
power” (id.).  Specifically, the Court focused on statements in the legislative 
history that expressed a desire “to defend the institution of traditional 
heterosexual marriage”40 and that voiced moral opposition to 
homosexuality.
41
  Quoting the legislative history, the Court wrote that “[t]he 
stated purpose of the law was to promote an ‘interest in protecting the 
traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws’” 
(id.). 
Certain consequences logically follow if the Windsor Court invalidated 
Section 3 of DOMA primarily because the statute was motivated by moral 
disapproval of same-sex marriage, sometimes rephrased as a desire to 
preserve traditional, heterosexual marriage.  Many relatively recent state 
bans on same-sex marriage around the nation appear to be similarly 
motivated.  Like DOMA, those bans were designed to prevent same-sex 
couples from marrying after other state courts or legislatures recognized their 
right to do so.
42
   
                                                 
38 Id. at 2705 (“My guess is that the majority, while reluctant to suggest that defining the meaning 
of ‘marriage’ in federal statutes is unsupported by any of the Federal Government’s enumerated 
powers,
 
nonetheless needs some rhetorical basis to support its pretense that today’s prohibition of laws 
excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal Government (leaving the second, state-law 
shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term).” (footnote omitted)); id. at 2709 (“It takes real cheek for 
today’s majority to assure us, as it is going out the door, that a constitutional requirement to give 
formal recognition to same-sex marriage is not at issue here—when what has preceded that assurance 
is a lecture on how superior the majority’s moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is to the 
Congress’s hateful moral judgment against it.”).   
39 See id. at 2693 (“Were there any doubt of this far-reaching purpose, the title of the Act confirms 
it: The Defense of Marriage.”) 
40 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104–664, at 12–13 (1996)) (“[I]t is both appropriate and necessary 
for Congress to do what it can to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage. . . . H.R. 
3396 is appropriately entitled the ‘Defense of Marriage Act.’ The effort to redefine ‘marriage’ to 
extend to homosexual couples is a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution 
of marriage.”). 
41 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104–664, at 16) (stating that DOMA expresses “both moral 
disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with 
traditional (especially Judeo–Christian) morality”).    
42 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 
2012) (“In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that it might violate the Hawaii constitution to deny 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Although Hawaii then empowered its legislature to block such 
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Even so, did not the Court’s analysis depend upon the conclusion that 
DOMA interfered with a “dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of 
their sovereign power”? (Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693).  In other words, did 
not the Court’s reasoning rest on the fact that New York had elected to 
recognize same-sex marriage?  Much of Justice Kennedy’s language 
(recorded above and in Part I) might cause one to draw that conclusion.  But 
other rhetoric and reasoning point in a different direction.   
In an under-noticed sentence in the opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that 
“[w]hen New York adopted a law to permit same-sex marriage, it sought to 
eliminate inequality” (id. 2694).  The Court thereby showed its hand, 
rejecting the submission of opponents of same-sex marriage that marriage is 
“an intrinsically opposite-sex institution,” as Justice Alito sympathetically 
characterized their position.
43
  Kennedy did not write that New York sought 
to eliminate inequality “as New York understood equality,” nor did he use 
other language suggesting neutrality on the question of whether bans on 
same-sex marriage are discriminatory.  The Court appeared to be speaking 
for itself.  
On the other hand, maybe such a qualifier was implicit, or maybe 
omitting it was a mere oversight.  Such an explanation may be difficult to 
credit, however, when one reads on.  Kennedy asserted provocatively that 
“DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code” (id. 2694).  
The Court did not observe that “DOMA writes inequality into the entire 
United States Code as Congress understands inequality.”  Presumably, the 
DOMA Congress did not understand itself to be doing any such thing, and 
presumably a mere oversight does not explain that passage. 
There is more.  The Windsor Court stressed not only the purpose of 
DOMA and the capacity of the institution of marriage to include same-sex 
couples, but also DOMA’s effects on same-sex couples and its dominant 
social meaning: 
By creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the 
same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married 
for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                             
a ruling—which it did—the Hawaii decision was followed by legalization of same-sex marriage in a 
small minority of states, some by statute and a few by judicial decision; many more states responded 
by banning same-sex marriage by statute or constitutional amendment.” (footnotes and citations 
omitted)).    
43 See id. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Our equal protection framework . . . . is ill suited for use 
in evaluating the constitutionality of laws based on the traditional understanding of marriage, which 
fundamentally turn on what marriage is.”); id. at 2718 (“[T]he ‘traditional’ or ‘conjugal’ view . . . sees 
marriage as an intrinsically opposite-sex institution . . . . essentially the solemnizing of a 
comprehensive, exclusive, permanent union that is intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even if 
it does not always do so.”) (citing SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN ANDERSON, & ROBERT GEORGE, WHAT IS 
MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE 23-28 (2012)). 
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federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of 
basic personal relations the State has found it proper to 
acknowledge and protect. By this dynamic DOMA 
undermines both the public and private significance of state-
sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those couples, and 
all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are 
unworthy of federal recognition. This places same-sex couples 
in an unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage. The 
differentiation demeans the couple. . . . And it humiliates tens 
of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex 
couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for 
the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their 
own family and its concord with other families in their 
community and in their daily lives (id.). 
In that pivotal passage, the Court moved beyond Congress’s purpose in 
passing DOMA to the impacts that DOMA had on same-sex couples and 
their children, and on the expressive message that DOMA sent to them.  
Those impacts and meanings do not seem limited to DOMA. 
On the contrary, all state laws that have been authoritatively interpreted 
to preclude same-sex marriage, even those enacted long before a Hawaii state 
court essentially held that prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying 
violated the state constitution,
44
 would seem to “tell[]” gay “couples, and all 
the world, that their otherwise valid [relationships] are unworthy of [state] 
recognition.”  All state bans on same-sex marriage, whenever enacted, would 
seem to “place[] same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a 
second-tier [relationship].”  The “differentiation” in all state bans on same-
sex marriage, whenever enacted, would seem to “demean[] the couple” and 
“humiliate[] tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex 
couples.”  All such bans would seem to “make[] it even more difficult for the 
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its 
concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.”45  
Notably, the final two sentences in the block quotation above do not 
reference a state-conferred right to marry.
46
 
B. Caution, Too, about State Control of Domestic Relations 
 
                                                 
44 Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 557 (1993) (holding that state law’s discriminatory definition of 
marriage triggered strict scrutiny under the state constitution). 
45 See Siegel, supra note 10, at 88-91 (reading Windsor similarly). 
46 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (“DOMA also brings financial harm to children of same-sex 
couples. It raises the cost of health care for families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to 
their workers’ same-sex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of 
a spouse and parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security.” (citations omitted)). 
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But how does one reconcile the foregoing reading of the majority opinion 
with the Court’s celebration of state regulation of domestic relations?  It may 
be challenging to do so, but it is noteworthy that the Court’s celebration is 
more nuanced than most of the dissenting Justices understood it to be.
47
  In 
“discuss[ing] the extent of the state power and authority over marriage as a 
matter of history and tradition,” the Court qualified its invocation of state 
control with the observation that “[s]tate laws defining and regulating 
marriage, of course, must respect the constitutional rights of persons” 
(Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691).  What is more, the Court cited Loving v. 
Virginia as an illustration (id. (citing Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
That citation was likely pointed and purposeful given the core claim of gay 
rights advocates that state bans on same-sex marriage are constitutionally 
indistinguishable from state bans on interracial marriage, which the Court 
invalidated in Loving.
48
  Indeed, the Loving Court invalidated Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation statute not only on equal protection grounds, but also on 
substantive due process grounds.
49
  It did so even though allowing a black 
person and a white person to marry could hardly be thought of as deeply 
rooted in American history and tradition—whether in 1967 or today.  The 
deeply rooted tradition was, to our national shame, exactly the opposite.
50
 
Perhaps the above observations read too much into an obvious, 
blackletter qualification.  “Of course,” to quote Justice Kennedy,51 states 
must respect constitutional rights, just as the federal government must honor 
them.  A few pages later, however, the Court reminded the reader again that 
state regulation of marriage is “subject to constitutional guarantees” 
(Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692).  And three paragraphs after that, the Court 
qualified its commentary a third time: “The States’ interest in defining and 
regulating the marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, stems 
from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine classification for 
purposes of certain statutory benefits” (id. (emphasis added)).  That last time, 
the Court invoked the authority of Lawrence.  “Private, consensual sexual 
intimacy between two adult persons of the same sex,” the Court wrote, “may 
not be punished by the State, and it can form ‘but one element in a personal 
                                                 
47 See supra Part I (quoting the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito). 
48 See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-395, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014) (opening its 
opinion invalidating Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage with a long quotation from Mildred Loving).   
49 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process 
of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has 
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men.”). 
50 For a discussion of the consistency of Loving with tradition, see Neil S. Siegel, The New 
Textualism, Progressive Constitutionalism, and Abortion Rights: A Reply to Jeffrey Rosen, 25 YALE 
J.L. & HUM. 55 (2013). 
51 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691. 
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bond that is more enduring’” (id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
567 (2003))). 
Although there is a risk of reading too much into those features of the 
opinion, it is nonetheless striking that, within the span of a few pages in a 
relatively short opinion, the Court thrice qualified its discussion of state 
power to regulate domestic relations by noting that states must respect 
individual constitutional rights.  It is also striking that the Court adorned its 
reminders with Loving on the front end and Lawrence on the back end.  At a 
minimum, those three reminders and two citations indicate that the Court did 
not offer a full-throated endorsement of state control over domestic relations.  
Instead, the Court qualified its extended discussion of state power to regulate 
marriage by underscoring federal judicial power to protect intimate 
relationships—including relationships that state law prohibits, and including 
relationships that would not have enjoyed constitutional protection 
throughout most of American history. 
Something else is noteworthy about the Court’s discussion of state 
control over domestic relations.  Not once did the Court state or imply that 
states are constitutionally free to define marriage as limited to opposite-sex 
couples.  On the contrary, the Court stressed—over and over again—only 
what a minority of states like New York had done to dignify same-sex 
relationships.  “By its recognition of the validity of same-sex marriages 
performed in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex unions and 
same-sex marriages,” the Court wrote, “New York sought to give further 
protection and dignity to that bond.”52  (Note the use of the adjective 
“further,” which suggests that the relationship warrants protection and 
possesses dignity even absent a state-conferred right to marry.)  The one-
sided nature of the Court’s discussion implies potential limits on the 
regulatory discretion that states enjoy.  It portends that what the Court 
viewed as a constitutional virtue in New York’s democratic process it will 
view as a constitutional vice in the processes of states that deny same-sex 
couples the option to marry.
53
 
In expressing caution about state control over domestic relations, the 
Court may have had in mind the “volumes of history” (United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)) that justify such caution.  Legal scholars 
have documented numerous historical instances in which the category of 
                                                 
52 Id.  See id. at 2689 (“And so New York recognized same-sex marriages performed elsewhere; 
and then it later amended its own marriage laws to permit same-sex marriage. New York, in common 
with, as of this writing, 11 other States and the District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples 
should have the right to marry and so live with pride in themselves and their union and in a status of 
equality with all other married persons.”).  For further discussion of the Court’s selectivity in 
discussing state practices, see infra Part III.A. 
53 Of course, all bets are off if a member of the Windsor majority is replaced by a Justice who 
would have dissented in Windsor. 
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“domestic relations” was successfully invoked by those who sought to 
insulate certain inequality-enforcing status relations from federal oversight.
54
  
For example, defenders of slavery invoked state control over domestic 
relations—specifically, the relationship between slave owner and slave—to 
protect slavery from federal interference.
55
  So did later defenders of 
American apartheid in enforcing racial segregation and banning interracial 
marriage.
56
 
During the Lochner Era, proponents of laissez faire invoked state control 
of domestic relations—specifically, the relationship between employer and 
employee—to defeat progressive federal legislation, which sought to 
ameliorate the imbalance of bargaining power between owners and 
workers.
57
  Similarly, in the decades between ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and ratification of the Nineteenth, opponents of women’s 
suffrage invoked state control of domestic relations—specifically, the 
relationship between husband and wife.
58
  As Reva Siegel has documented, 
“the states long enforced women’s subordinate status through the law of the 
family, and a tradition of federal deference to state law grew up at least in 
part to preserve the status order that state law enforced” (id. at 1036).  Part 
and parcel of that tradition was denying women the right to vote—the most 
basic right of citizenship in a democracy—from 1789 until 1920 on the 
                                                 
54 See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 62 (2000) 
(“Slavery fell under the ‘master-servant’ category in the law, which also included employer/employee 
relations.  Master-servant and husband-wife relations were categorized together as domestic relations, 
because the authority vested in the household head determined them all.”); Reva B. Siegel, She the 
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
947, 1038 (2002) (noting that “slavery was once denominated a ‘domestic relation’ beyond the reach 
of federal law, as was the labor relationship as the Court reminded us in Carter Coal” (referencing 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936)).  
55 See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
1297, 1319 (1998) (“[T]o many nineteenth-century Americans, especially Southerners, slavery was a 
domestic relation. For decades before the Civil War, opponents of federal intervention into slavery 
made this point consistently. Although never ignoring race, they importantly framed the legitimacy of 
federal antislavery efforts as turning on whether the federal government could regulate the family law 
of the states.” (footnotes omitted)). 
56 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 7 (1967) (noting that “[p]enalties for miscegenation 
arose as an incident to slavery, and have been common in Virginia since the colonial period,” and 
reporting that the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage 
partly because “marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, 
and, consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by the Tenth 
Amendment”).  The Loving Court referenced Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), an 
appeal the Warren Court infamously dismissed, despite an apparent absence of discretion to dismiss, 
just after deciding Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  The Court was proceeding with 
the sort of Bickelian caution discussed in Parts III.C and III.D.    
57 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (“The relation of employer and 
employee is a local relation.  At common law, it is one of the domestic relations.”). 
58 See Siegel, supra note 54, at 1038 (observing that “[a]rguments for local control of domestic 
relations once shielded chattel slavery, gender restrictions on voting, and child labor from federal 
regulation”). 
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grounds that women were virtually represented by their husbands and that 
allowing women to vote would cause marital discord (id. at 977-997). 
The Windsor Court may have been quietly cognizant of at least some of 
that history.  It also may have registered, however, that the category of 
domestic relations is fluid—that “the particular relationships this tradition 
insulates from federal regulation are constantly in flux.”59  The future is 
different from the past when states change their own laws, as New York did 
in Windsor; when Congress passes transformative civil rights legislation; 
when the Supreme Court protects rights that previously went unprotected; 
and, much less frequently, when Americans amend the Constitution.
60
 
The Windsor Court appeared to embrace that American tradition, too.
61
   
It seemed quietly to understand the lesson of American history that state 
legislative power over domestic relations must co-exist with supreme federal 
power to ensure that the Constitution includes within its embrace persons 
who previously did not count, or count for much, in constituting “the People” 
in whose name the Constitution claims to govern.
62
 
Other passages in the majority opinion evidence the Court’s caution 
about state control over domestic relations.  It is easy to read past those 
passages, but their presence makes it difficult to conclude that the Court 
viewed marriage as an institution that the Constitution leaves to the states.  
Rather than invalidate Section 3 of DOMA as beyond the scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause (which was possible but admittedly unlikely 
given the focus of the question presented on equal protection), the Court 
endorsed broad federal power under that clause as a general matter, including 
in the area of domestic relations, and including with respect to marriage.  
“By history and tradition,” the Court began its analysis by noting, “the 
definition and regulation of marriage . . . has been treated as being within the 
authority and realm of the separate States” (Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689-90). 
And yet, immediately upon recording that observation, the Court reminded 
                                                 
59 Id. at 1038.  See Resnik, supra note 26, at 382 (“Just as in the nineteenth century, the question 
of slavery moved from the category of master-servant relationships to that of civil rights, so too in the 
twentieth century did women become ‘persons’ protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. VAWA 
marked another of equality’s frontiers by insisting that ‘domestic violence’ cease to be a matter of 
‘private’ relationships and become a matter of equal treatment under national law.”); Kristin A. 
Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ 
Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1768 (2005) (“[T]he state sovereignty paradigm is not a fixed 
federalism principle, but has evolved over time in the context of heated debates over various proposed 
federal regulations that, in some respect, touched on domestic relations.”).   
60 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX. 
61 See, e.g., RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 193 (1987) (“[A] 
prime portion of the history of the U.S. Constitution, and a cause for celebration, is the story of the 
extension (through amendment, judicial interpretation, and practice) of constitutional rights and 
protections to once ignored or excluded people: to humans who were once held in bondage, to men 
without property, to the original inhabitants of the land that became the United States, and to women.”)   
62 U.S. CONST. preamble. 
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the reader of another legal proposition that is firmly established.  “[I]n 
enacting discrete statutes,” the Court wrote, Congress “can make 
determinations that bear on marital rights and privileges” (id. 2690). 
The Court used as a first example its unanimous decision from earlier in 
the Term, Hillman v. Maretta (id. 1943).  The Court there held that federal 
law preempted Virginia law on the question whether a former wife could 
retain life insurance proceeds that were claimed by a subsequent wife who 
had survived the husband (id. 1955).  The Federal Employees’ Group Life 
Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA) (5 U.S.C. § 8701 et seq.) establishes a life 
insurance program for federal employees.  It allows an employee to designate 
a beneficiary to receive the proceeds of the policy when the employee dies.   
State law also regulates the designation of beneficiaries in life insurance 
policies.  For example, Section 20–111.1(D) of the Virginia Code addresses 
what happens when an employee’s marital status changed, but the employee 
did not update his beneficiary designation before dying.  The Virginia law 
renders a former spouse liable for insurance proceeds to whomever would 
have received them under applicable law, typically a widow or widower, but 
for the beneficiary designation (Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(D) (Lexis Supp. 
2012)). 
In Hillman, the Court held unanimously that FEGLIA and its 
implementing regulations preempt the remedy created by §20–111.1(D), 
notwithstanding the “‘presumption against preemption’ of state laws 
governing domestic relations.”63  Because Congress had acted within the 
constitutional scope of its enumerated powers, and because the state law 
“interfere[d] with Congress’s objective that insurance proceeds belong to the 
named beneficiary,” the Court allowed the former spouse to retain the 
proceeds of the life insurance policy (id. 1955). 
The Hillman Court’s decision—in opposition to state law—that the first 
of two spouses would enjoy life insurance proceeds could be characterized as 
a significant federal intrusion into the state’s traditional authority to regulate 
the institution of marriage.  The Windsor Court, however, characterized its 
decision in Hillman as an ordinary application of its reasoning in two 
previous cases from the 1950s and 1980s.
64
  It characterized its ruling as but 
“one example of the general principle that when the Federal Government acts 
in the exercise of its own proper authority, it has a wide choice of the 
                                                 
63 Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1950.  See Mark Strasser, Congress, Federal Courts, and Domestic 
Relations Exceptionalism, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 193, 230 (2012) (“The Court frequently discusses 
the importance of reserving family law for the states but rarely strikes down federal legislation 
[displacing state domestic relations law], rigorous standard for upholding such laws 
notwithstanding.”). 
64 The Hillman Court, see id. at 1950-51, relied on Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981), and 
Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950). 
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mechanisms and means to adopt.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 421 (1819)” (Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675, 2690). 
The Court’s invocation of McCulloch might also seem ordinary, but it 
was significant in light of another recent decision.  Four Justices—including 
Justice Kennedy—concluded in NFIB v. Sebelius (132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)) 
that the minimum coverage provision in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act
65
 was beyond the scope of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in part because it was not truly necessary—that is, because Congress 
could have sought to achieve its objectives in other ways.
66
  The State of 
Maryland had proposed a similarly narrow reading of the term “necessary” in 
McCulloch, but the Marshall Court rejected it and no subsequent Court 
accepted it.
67
  After arguably neglecting in NFIB that “it is a Constitution we 
are expounding” (id. at 407), Kennedy, now writing for the Court, appeared 
to return to long-settled law in Windsor.  He made clear that “Congress has 
the power both to ensure efficiency in the administration of its programs and 
to choose what larger goals and policies to pursue” (Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
2690).  
The Windsor Court noted “[o]ther precedents involving congressional 
statutes which affect marriages” to further illustrate the point that Congress 
may make decisions bearing on marital rights (id.).  Notwithstanding state 
domestic relations law, the Court wrote, Congress permissibly determined 
that marriages “entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s 
admission [to the United States] as an immigrant” will not entitle the 
noncitizen to admission (id.). It is of no consequence, the Court asserted, that 
“the noncitizen’s marriage is valid and proper for state-law purposes” (id.).  
The Court cited another example.  “[I]n establishing income-based 
criteria for Social Security benefits,” the Court observed, Congress decided 
that “state law would determine in general who qualifies as an applicant’s 
spouse,” but that “common-law marriages also should be recognized, 
regardless of any particular State’s view on these relationships” (id.).  Like 
the previous illustrations, that one is significant to the individuals involved 
and to the states that seek to maintain regulatory control over the institution 
of marriage.  Major financial and expressive consequences may attach to 
federal determinations of the meaning of marriage in particular 
circumstances.  Even so, the Court insisted that all “these discrete examples 
                                                 
65 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered Sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
66 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2647 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (“[T]here are many ways other than this unprecedented Individual Mandate by which the 
regulatory scheme’s goals of reducing insurance premiums and ensuring the profitability of insurers 
could be achieved.”). 
67 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-25 (1819). 
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establish the constitutionality of limited federal laws that regulate the 
meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy” (id.). 
As discussed in Part I, the Court stated that Section 3 of DOMA was 
constitutionally problematic in part because it had “a far greater reach” than 
those other federal laws (id.).  In the Court’s telling, DOMA “enacts a 
directive applicable to over 1,000 federal statutes and the whole realm of 
federal regulations” (id.).  It was in part because of DOMA’s extraordinary 
reach that the Court deemed it “necessary to discuss the extent of the state 
power and authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition” (id. 
2691). 
Note the key fact that inspired the Court’s discussion of state law 
governing domestic relations:  in today’s world, it is possible for an all-
purpose federal definition of marriage to control a vast number of federal 
statutes and regulations.  That fact speaks directly to the modern 
constitutional scope of federal power to intervene in the realm of “domestic 
relations.”  DOMA’s reach was vast because, in modern America, federal 
regulation of marriage is vast.  The Court accepted that reality.
68
 
Significantly, the Court accepted that reality in a discussion that preceded 
and put into perspective its assertion that “‘regulation of domestic relations’ 
is ‘an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of 
the States’” (Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 
393, 404 (1975)).  Rather than call into constitutional question any of the 
1,138 federal statutes or regulations controlled by DOMA’s federal definition 
of marriage, the Court leveraged their presumptive constitutionality—their 
ordinary, “discrete” constitutional natures (id. 2690, 2692)—to criticize 
DOMA’s extraordinary reach.   
What emerges from the Court’s response to Windsor is a broad 
understanding of the constitutional scope of Congress’s enumerated powers, 
including under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and including in the area 
of domestic relations.  The majority opinion in Windsor did not continue to 
narrow the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as five Justices did to 
an uncertain extent in NFIB.
69
  The Windsor Court’s understanding of 
congressional power was broad and flexible, even if it was not as broad and 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 
YALE L.J. 619, 644-45 (2001) (“[C]ontemporary federal family law is a mélange of national norms 
aimed at affirming certain conceptions about how families are constituted, what relationships within 
families have primacy, and the material consequences of family life.”). 
69 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591-93 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644-
47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoted supra note 66).  For a critical 
discussion of the Chief Justice’s rationale, which differed from that of the joint opinion, see generally 
Neil S. Siegel, More Law than Politics: The Chief, the “Mandate,” Legality, and Statesmanship, in 
THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 192, 201-05 
(Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013).   
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flexible as that of Chief Justice Marshall’s in McCulloch.70  It evidences the 
Court’s view that the area of “domestic relations” is not free of federal 
oversight—that marriage is not an institution that the Constitution simply 
leaves to the states.  
 
C. Implications of the Reading 
 
According to the foregoing reading of Windsor, the Court concluded that 
Section 3 of DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment because it had not only 
the purpose, but also the effect and social meaning, of diminishing the 
equality and demeaning the dignity of gay people by excluding them from an 
institution that is not inherently unsuitable to their inclusion.
71
  Neither 
extraordinary evidence of animus nor New York’s decision to legalize same-
sex marriage is critical to that conclusion.  If Windsor is so understood, what 
distinguishable interest does any state have in prohibiting same-sex 
marriage?  
There does not appear to be a persuasive answer to that question—at least 
as long as the Court continues to focus upon the actual interests animating 
laws that discriminate against gay people, and not on any conceivable 
legitimate state interest.
72
  The key assumption of this section, in other 
words, is that the Court will continue to apply de facto heightened scrutiny, 
as it did in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor itself.
73
  
                                                 
70 The Court used the language of rational basis review in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 
(2004), and United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), which Justice Kennedy 
resisted in his opinion in Comstock.  See 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) 
(stressing the importance of “a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration,” which, 
“[w]hile undoubtedly deferential . . . may well be different from the rational-basis test”). 
71 Analysis of purposes, effects, and social meanings formed the analytic spine of arguably the 
greatest defense of Brown.  See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 
YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (“Can a system which, in all that can be measured, has practiced the 
grossest inequality, actually have been ‘equal’ in intent, in total social meaning and impact? ‘Thy 
speech maketh thee manifest. . .’; segregation, in all visible things, speaks only haltingly any dialect 
but that of inequality.”). 
72 In traditional rational basis cases, courts accept as adequate any conceivable legitimate 
governmental interest for a law, without regard to the legislature’s actual purposes.  See, e.g., 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).  
73 The Windsor Court rejected or ignored asserted federal interests in uniformity and stability, 
which were conceivable if not actual.  See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Interests in uniformity and stability amply justified Congress’s decision to retain the definition of 
marriage that, at that point, had been adopted by every State in our Nation, and every nation in the 
world.”); Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To choose just one of these defenders’ arguments, 
DOMA avoids difficult choice-of-law issues that will now arise absent a uniform federal definition of 
marriage.” (citing William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. 1371 (2012))); Merits Brief of Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group at 28-49, United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (citing numerous possible federal interests).  Precedent 
disabled BLAG from defending the statute on moral grounds.  See supra notes 40-41 (quoting the 
legislative history). 
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For example, the official sponsors of California’s Proposition 8 made the 
procreation argument for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.
74
  That 
argument is difficult to credit given its significant under- and over-
inclusiveness, which suggests that it is not an actual state interest animating 
such restrictions.  “If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is no 
legitimate state interest for purposes of proscribing that conduct,” Justice 
Scalia asked in his Lawrence dissent, “what justification could there possibly 
be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising the 
liberty protected by the Constitution? Surely not the encouragement of 
procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”75 
While many married couples do not procreate, many same-sex couples 
do.  They procreate through artificial insemination, surrogacy, and adoption.  
Registering that reality, Justice Kennedy criticized DOMA’s humiliation of 
“tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples,” who 
may find it more difficult “to understand the integrity and closeness of their 
own family and its concord with other families in their community and in 
their daily lives” (Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694).  Accordingly, the procreation 
rationale for determining access to the institution of marriage may cut in 
favor of same-sex marriage. 
The New York Court of Appeals, writing before New York legalized 
same-sex marriage, hypothesized that limiting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples might serve another state interest.  The court speculated that a 
legislature might rationally conclude that opposite-sex couples have more of 
a need for marriage than same-sex couples in order to stabilize their 
relationships for the sake of their children.
76
  That hypothesis seems difficult 
to credit as an actual state interest.  No state appears to limit marriage to 
opposite-sex couples for that reason. 
The New York Court of Appeals offered another rationale.  “The 
Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other things being equal, 
for children to grow up with both a mother and a father,” the court reasoned, 
because “[i]ntuition and experience suggest that a child benefits from having 
before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both a man and a 
woman are like” (id.). That interest seems neither actual nor permissible.  No 
state appears to ban same-sex marriage for that reason.  Moreover, it seems 
                                                 
74 See Brief of Petitioners at 53, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144) (asserting 
that marriage traditionally has had a procreative purpose and that allowing same-sex marriage would 
undermine that purpose by focusing the institution on satisfying adult desires, not on raising children). 
75 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
76 See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y. 3d 338, 359 (2006) (writing that “the Legislature could 
rationally offer the benefits of marriage to opposite-sex couples only” because only they “become 
parents as a result of accident or impulse,” so that “promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships 
will help children more”).   
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to rest on the very traditional sex-role stereotypes that the Court has held to 
violate the Equal Protection Clause in sex discrimination cases (see, e.g., 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).  In any event, it is not clear 
how prohibiting gay people from marrying (as opposed to parenting) 
advances the hypothesized interest.
77
 
This discussion of arguments for limiting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.  Perhaps there are better 
arguments out there.  But it is not evident what legitimate, let alone 
important, interest states can have in prohibiting same-sex couples from 
marrying when the Court has taken off the table both moral opposition to 
homosexuality, which DOMA sought to express (as did Colorado and Texas 
in previous cases),
78
 and the constitutive conviction that marriage is 
inherently an opposite-sex institution, such that there is no discrimination 
and resulting inequality to speak of.  Moreover, the Court has deemed 
constitutionally pertinent not only the purposes, but also the effects and 
social meanings of laws excluding gay people from the institution of 
marriage.  Finally, it has examined those effects and social meanings from 
the perspective of those who are excluded.  It has not told same-sex couples 
that if they think their exclusion from the institution of marriage “stamps 
[them] with a badge of inferiority, . . . it is not by reason of anything found in 
the act, but solely because [they] choose[] to put that construction upon it” 
(Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)). 
 
D. Limits of the Reading 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Chief Justice’s “federalism” reading 
of the Court’s opinion in Windsor is less persuasive than one that views the 
Court as focused on ordinary evidence of legislative animus.  There are, 
however, definite limits to the equality reading as well.  The Court did not 
formally commit itself and other courts to invalidating all state bans on same-
sex marriage; it has left open the possibility that at least some such bans may 
                                                 
77 A distinct claim invokes empirical evidence for the assertion that the children of opposite-sex 
parents are better off than the children of same-sex parents.  That claim is hotly contested in the 
scientific literature.  See, e.g., Brief of American Psychological Ass’n et al., United States v. Windsor, 
No. 12-307, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), at 5, http://www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/windsor-us.pdf 
(“[T]he claim that legal recognition of marriage for same-sex couples undermines the institution of 
marriage and harms their children is inconsistent with the scientific evidence.”). 
78 See H.R. REP. No. 104–664, at 15-16 (“Civil laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect 
and honor a collective moral judgment about human sexuality. This judgment entails both moral 
disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with 
traditional (especially Judeo–Christian) morality.”).  The Court also rejected moral opposition to 
homosexuality as a legitimate state interest in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).   
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be supported by sufficient—and sufficiently distinguishable—state interests.  
It has left open that possibility for two reasons.   
First, as in Lawrence,
79
 the Court declined to announce that it was 
applying heightened scrutiny to discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  It instead chose to talk the talk of rational basis review,
80
 even as 
it applied what might appropriately be called rational basis “double-plus.”  
As will be explained in Part III, Justice Kennedy likely would have lost his 
majority had he explicitly embraced heightened scrutiny, and he himself 
seems more inclined to encourage than to compel for the time being. 
Second, the state-regarding language is there in the majority opinion.
81
  
The language may seem logically unnecessary to the Court’s equal protection 
analysis and less than entirely convincing:  it is not clear why same-sex 
marriages would be constitutionally protected from governmental 
discrimination when intimate same-sex relationships were not.  Few people 
on either side of the constitutional debate over same-sex marriage appear to 
believe in such a distinction.  It seems arbitrary, and it has failed in the 
past—specifically, when the Court began protecting access to contraception 
as a fundamental right.
82
  But the language is there, and its being there leaves 
room for opponents of same-sex marriage to argue that the equality 
protections afforded same-sex marriages are more robust than the protections 
afforded same-sex relationships. 
Overall, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor resists all 
dispositive interpretations.  It is sufficiently undisciplined when evaluated 
according to conventional categories of constitutional analysis that it actually 
seems designed that way.  One cannot be certain about the motivations of a 
single Justice, let alone a group of them, but the opinion does appear 
purposely to preserve for itself a certain Delphic abstruseness.  This Article 
                                                 
79 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which 
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”). 
80 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“The federal statute is invalid, for 
no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the 
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”). 
81 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)); id. at 
2692 (“Here the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a 
dignity and status of immense import.”). 
82 Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 (1965) (protecting the right of married couples 
to use contraception), with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (protecting the right of all 
individuals to use contraception).  As with the issue of contraception in Griswold, it may have 
reassured the Windsor Court that the facts involved married couples.  In that sense, it may matter that 
Griswold came before Eisenstadt, and that Windsor came before a challenge to a state ban on same-sex 
marriage whose constitutionality the Court is prepared to decide.  But the logic of neither Griswold nor 
Windsor seems persuasively limited to married couples.  To continue the analogy, Hollingworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), may be playing the role of Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), in 
which the Court declared the absence of standing in initially declining to decide the constitutionality of 
the Connecticut law.  For a discussion of Hollingsworth, see infra Part III.D. 
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will next attempt to understand why the opinion seems to view partial 
opacity as a virtue.  
 
III.   FEDERALISM AS A WAY STATION 
 
Three features of the majority opinion in Windsor are particularly 
puzzling.  First, as discussed extensively in Part II, the Court qualified a 
strong endorsement of the equal constitutional dignity of same-sex couples 
by stressing (even as it qualified) the tradition of state control over domestic 
relations.  In so doing, the Court potentially enabled others to draw a 
distinction between discrimination against same-sex couples and 
discrimination against same-sex marriages. 
Second, rather than understand history in “deeply rooted” traditionalist 
terms,
83
 the Court invoked certain state developments in the service of living 
constitutionalism.  It celebrated the vertical constitutional structure for 
enabling states like New York to evolve towards greater respect for the equal 
dignity of same-sex couples.  It also seemed to regard certain state-level 
practices of living constitutionalism as sources of learning for the nation, 
including the federal courts, about the content of constitutional rights.  The 
Court was highly selective in attending to state developments, however, and 
it offered no explanation for ignoring the laws of the majority of states. 
Third, the Windsor Court expressed its concerns about federal overreach 
in a way that could advance, but never undermine, the equal citizenship 
stature of gay Americans.  Specifically, it used those federalism concerns 
only to support a finding of congressional animus, which violates equal 
protection principles protected against federal infringement by the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause (see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
(1954)).  The Court’s use of federalism reasoning as a one-way ratchet 
appears neither essential to the outcome nor likely to do much work in future 
cases.  Such use, therefore, raises the question of what it was doing in the 
Court’s opinion. 
This Article has already discussed the first puzzle at length and will 
return to it in Part III.C.  The next two sections discuss the second and third 
puzzles in greater detail than the Article has so far. 
 
 
 
 
A. Federalism in the Service of Living Constitutionalism 
                                                 
83 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he opinion does not argue that 
same-sex marriage is ‘deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition,’ a claim that would of course 
be quite absurd.” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)). 
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The Windsor Court used federalism in the service of living 
constitutionalism.  Specifically, the Court leveraged changes in how certain 
states regulate marriage in order to expand the scope of constitutional rights 
protected at the national level.  Living constitutionalists believe that the 
meanings of many constitutional provisions change in practice, and often 
should change in practice, in response to changes in social conditions and 
values.
84
   
An example of living constitutionalism is Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Lawrence v Texas (539 U.S. 558 (2003)).  After holding that the 
Due Process Clauses protect the “moral and sexual choices”85 of gay people, 
Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Constitution’s Framers and ratifiers, in 
both 1791 and 1868, knew what they did not know:  
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known 
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they 
might have been more specific. They did not presume to have 
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths 
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary 
and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles 
in their own search for greater freedom (Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. U.S. 579 (2003)). 
For the Lawrence Court, the high level of generality at which the Framers 
wrote the Due Process Clauses reflects the humility with which they 
regarded their own understandings of constitutional liberty.  Instead of trying 
to figure it all out themselves, they endowed each subsequent generation of 
Americans with the constitutional authority partially to define the “liberty” 
protected by those clauses.
86
 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor approached the 
constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA in the same interpretive fashion.  In 
turning from the threshold question of justiciability to the merits,
87
 the Court 
documented the changes over time in public values regarding same-sex 
                                                 
84 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 226 (2011) (“Living 
constitutionalists argue that the practical meaning of the Constitution changes—and should change—in 
response to changing conditions. . . . The central concern of living constitutionalism is adjusting to 
change—whether to changed social conditions or changed values.”).   
85 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (characterizing the holding in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003)). 
86 For a sophisticated development of that position, see generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM (2011) (distinguishing among the rules, standards, and principles in the Constitution).   
87 The Court first had to decide whether it lacked jurisdiction given the government’s agreement 
with Ms. Windsor that Section 3 violated equal protection.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684-89. 
30 JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 19-May-14 
 
 
marriage.  Those values, the Court wrote, had at first frustrated the 
“long[ing]” (id. at 2689) of Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer to marry: 
It seems fair to conclude that, until recent years, many citizens 
had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the 
same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity 
as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage.  For marriage 
between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by 
most people as essential to the very definition of that term and 
to its role and function throughout the history of civilization.  
That belief, for many who long have held it, became even 
more urgent, more cherished when challenged (id.). 
If the Court had cared only about whether same-sex marriage falls within the 
original meaning of the Due Process Clause, or whether same-sex marriage is 
“deeply rooted” in the nation’s history and tradition, the Court’s initial 
observations would have been a conversation stopper.  The Court took that 
conservative traditionalist approach in McDonald v City of Chicago.
88
  So 
did Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, in Windsor.
89
 
For the Windsor Court, by contrast, the older view of marriage was only 
the beginning of the constitutional conversation: 
For others, however, came the beginnings of a new 
perspective, a new insight.  Accordingly some States 
concluded that same-sex marriage ought to be given 
recognition and validity in the law for those same-sex couples 
who wish to define themselves by their commitment to each 
other.  The limitation of lawful marriage to heterosexual 
couples, which for centuries had been deemed both necessary 
and fundamental, came to be seen in New York and certain 
other States as an unjust exclusion.
90
 
Writing with evident sympathy, the Court noted that the Empire State, 
“slowly at first and then in rapid course, . . . came to acknowledge the 
urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm their 
commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, 
and their community” (id.).  After deliberating over the question statewide, 
the Court wrote, “New York acted to enlarge the definition of marriage to 
                                                 
88 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (“[W]e must decide whether 
the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, or as we have said in a 
related context, whether this right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
89 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It is beyond dispute that the right to 
same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”). 
90 Id. at 2689.  One might wonder whether the passages quoted in the text are autobiographical. 
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correct what its citizens and elected representatives perceived to be an 
injustice that they had not earlier known or understood” (id.).  In those 
passages, the Court embraced living constitutionalism.
91
 
But the Court did more than that.  It also celebrated the Constitution’s 
federal structure for enabling states to practice living constitutionalism: 
In acting first to recognize and then to allow same-sex 
marriages, New York was responding “to the initiative of 
those who [sought] a voice in shaping the destiny of their own 
times.” These actions were without doubt a proper exercise of 
its sovereign authority within our federal system, all in the 
way that the Framers of the Constitution intended. The 
dynamics of state government in the federal system are to 
allow the formation of consensus respecting the way the 
members of a discrete community treat each other in their 
daily contact and constant interaction with each other 
(Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Bond v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 2355, 2359 (2011))). 
Rather than consult only Founding era or nineteenth century views to 
understand how the states may exercise their regulatory authority over the 
institution of marriage today,
92
 the Court regarded the states as appropriately 
moving to include within that institution persons who were excluded for 
almost all of American history—and who remain excluded in most states at 
present.  The Court commended New York for acting on “the community’s 
considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage 
and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality” (id. 2692-93 
(emphasis added)).  
The Court did not discuss, let alone celebrate, the decisions of other 
states to exclude same-sex couples from the institution of marriage.  Reading 
                                                 
91 Justice Kennedy did not distinguish state judicial decisions protecting a right to same-sex 
marriage from state statutes permitting same-sex couples to marry.  See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675, 2690 (reproducing the citations to state cases and laws in the majority opinion).  Both 
interventions may qualify as instances of living constitutionalism, which draw from the constitutional 
convictions of judicial and non-judicial actors.  See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 86, at 279 (offering a 
living constitutionalist “theory about how the entire system of constitutional construction—including 
the work of the political branches, courts, political parties, social movements, interest groups, and 
individual citizens—is consistent with democratic legitimacy”).  State political decisions to allow 
same-sex marriage, however, are also compatible with originalism and conservative traditionalism.  
For example, when Justice Scalia dissents in equal protection cases, he often endorses democratic 
incorporation of changing societal attitudes.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“So to counterbalance the Court’s criticism of our ancestors, let me say 
a word in their praise: They left us free to change.”). 
92 Justice Alito, by contrast, “suspect[ed] it would have been hard at the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution or the Fifth Amendment to find Americans who did not take the traditional view [of 
marriage] for granted.”  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting).    
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the majority opinion, one might be inclined to forget the historical fact of the 
matter, which is that even as states are legitimating same-sex marriage, they 
are also banning it.  The Court, in other words, attended to constitutional 
culture and debate, but it attended to only one side.
93
  That partiality is 
puzzling, and it raises the question whether the Court was just using 
federalism (conceived as attention to state practices and developments) in the 
service of living constitutionalism, or whether it was doing something more. 
An answer supporting the first characterization might begin by noting 
how much Congress taught the Court about sex equality in the years before 
the Court began invalidating sex classifications that reflected or reinforced 
the sex-role stereotypes of the separate spheres tradition.
94
  Congress moved 
before the Court did, and the Court invoked congressional action as relevant 
constitutional authority when it decided to intervene.
95
  Centuries earlier, the 
Court learned from the political branches about the constitutionality of a 
national bank.
96
  The supremacy rhetoric in cases like City of Boerne v. 
Flores
97
 may occlude the dialectical relationship between constitutional 
politics and constitutional law, but it is present in the horizontal 
constitutional structure. 
The Windsor Court may have been suggesting that similar lines of 
constitutional communication can be present within the vertical 
constitutional structure.  More specifically, the Court may have been 
reasoning that one of the roles of the states in the federal system is to inform 
the judgment of the rest of the country, including the federal courts, about the 
content of constitutional rights.  On that view, New York and other states 
that have allowed same-sex marriage are modeling for the rest of the nation, 
and for the Court, a fuller understanding of the Constitution’s protections of 
equality and liberty.  Just as the Court during the 1970s learned from 
                                                 
93 Cf. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1147, 1168 (1993) (envisioning state constitutionalism as “a process of giving voice to the state court’s 
understanding of the values and principles of the national community,” which enriches “the meaning 
of American citizenship” particularly “because fifty different courts will talk with each other, as well 
as with the federal courts, about the meaning of a common enterprise”). 
94 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: 
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003) 
(“We draw on both history and theory to show that Section 5 legislation has in the past helped to 
establish democratic foundations for the Court’s own articulation of constitutional rights.”). 
95 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion of Brennan, 
J.) (“Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this 
conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently 
under consideration.”). 
96 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (“The principle now contested 
was introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recognised by many successive 
legislatures, and has been acted upon by the Judicial Department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law 
of undoubted obligation.”). 
97 See, e.g., 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (declaring that Congress has no authority “to determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation”). 
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Congress about the content of constitutional rights when it began to hold that 
the Equal Protection Clause protects women, too, so Congress in the 19th 
Century and (belatedly) the Court in the 20th Century learned from 
Jefferson’s and Madison’s opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798—which 
was embodied in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.
98
  Likewise, the 
Court today may be learning from an increasing number of states that the 
Equal Protection Clause protects gay people, too.  One might think of the 
states as serving as “laboratories of constitutionalism.”99 
The legal acceptance of same-sex marriage in twelve states (as of the date 
of the Court’s decision) partially reflected substantial changes in popular 
constitutional convictions about the meaning of equality and liberty in the 
United States.  The Court underscored—and seemed to endorse—those 
transformations by including a long string citation in the text of its opinion 
(Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675, 2690).  The Court seemed to be implying that, 
in the American federal system, certain states may see clearly when “times . . 
. blind” the rest of “us to certain truths” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
579 (2003)). On that interpretation, New Yorkers and likeminded citizens in 
other states have led by invoking the Constitution’s “principles in their own 
search for greater freedom” (id. 579), and the Court is electing to follow—
although not entirely just yet.
100
 
Up until the Twentieth Century, federal courts routinely cited state 
supreme courts on such constitutional questions as the meaning of due 
process and the limits of the states’ police powers.101  Today, however, it is 
relatively uncommon for the Justices to view state-level constitutional 
interpretations as relevant to the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.
102
  Federal 
                                                 
98 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (invoking “the lesson to be 
drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798, which first crystallized a national 
awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment”); id. at 274 (noting that “the Act was 
vigorously condemned as unconstitutional in an attack joined in by Jefferson and Madison”). 
99 Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”).  
100 Of course, the Court also played a leadership role in Romer and Lawrence. 
101 During the Nineteenth Century, it was thought that state and federal courts shared a general 
constitutional law tied to notions of natural rights.  See, e.g., Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 
655 (1874); BREST ET AL., supra note 10, at 330-32.  After the New Deal, federal courts cited state 
court decisions on constitutional questions far less frequently than in the past, presumably in part 
because of the association of the practice with natural law/Lochner Era reasoning. 
102 State law does, however, furnish the predicate for various federal constitutional claims under 
the Contracts Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Takings Clause, and the Due Process Clauses.  That 
is because property and contract interests are generally a function of state law.  See, e.g., Florida v. 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (holding, based on the common law trespass rationale of United States 
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), that a dog sniff at the front door of a house where the police suspected 
marijuana was being grown was a search under the Fourth Amendment); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. 
Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (adjudicating a Contracts Clause claim by first looking to state law for the 
existence of a valid contract).  As discussed in Part I, Randy Barnett read the majority opinion in 
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courts “do not use . . . state constitutional doctrine to nearly the same degree 
as state courts have used federal doctrine.”103  Even so, there are “some 
notable exceptions to the general [modern] history of neglect” in the areas of 
the First Amendment, criminal procedure, substantive due process, and the 
Eighth Amendment.
104
  Sometimes, as in the criminal procedure context, the 
Court engages in “a pragmatic form of learning from the states’ experience 
and growing unanimity about [various] practical matters” (id. 371).  Other 
times, as in its substantive due process and Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, “the Court has looked to widely shared state practice as 
‘objective’ evidence of whether a particular right is fundamental or a 
particular punishment is cruel or unusual” (id.).  The Windsor Court seemed 
to look to the laws of New York and similarly situated states for a third, 
distinct purpose:  for normative guidance about the constitutional meaning of 
equality and liberty for same-sex couples who wish to marry. 
The foregoing interpretation of Windsor “cuts” only one way—namely, 
in favor of legal protection of same-sex marriage—because that is the only 
way in which the Windsor Court deemed it appropriate to draw from state 
experience.  Perhaps, however, the interpretation cuts only one way in an 
appropriate fashion because it ultimately turns on the content of 
constitutional rights
105—which, of course, will not always be “progressive” 
rights.
106
  Moreover, while such an account is ultimately “about” the content 
of rights, not the content of structure, it may also be about the vertical 
constitutional structure.  The account locates within the vertical 
constitutional structure an important potential source of wisdom about 
judicially enforceable constitutional rights.  Just as changes in rights 
consciousness profoundly affect understandings of the constitutional 
                                                                                                                             
Windsor as reasoning decisively that New York had created an equality and liberty interest, which the 
federal government lacked sufficient reason to destroy. 
103 Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 
370-71 (2011). 
104 Id. at 371; see id. at 371-80 (discussing the Court’s doctrine in those areas). 
105 The line between federal provisions that support rights and those that undermine them may be 
difficult to draw when rights conflict, such as when anti-discrimination norms clash with free exercise 
values.  For example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) can be used as a defense 
against fair housing or anti-discrimination laws.  See RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4).  In cases of conflict, 
constitutional interpreters have no choice but to balance incommensurable values.    
106 Consider, for example, the right to keep and bear arms.  See U.S CONST. amend. II. 
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structure,
107
 so the structure presents opportunities for a variety of 
constitutional actors to shape rights consciousness.
108
 
The idea of the states as laboratories of constitutionalism has much to 
commend it.  Such a defense of the Court’s approach in Windsor, however, 
does not explain why the Court’s consultation of state practices was so one-
sided.  The Court, to reiterate, discussed only the experience of the minority 
of states that have recognized same-sex marriage.  In theory, however, 
drawing from state law need not cut only in favor of expanding constitutional 
rights.  State experience may constitute persuasive authority for declining to 
recognize certain claims to constitutional attention, or for limiting the scope 
of pre-existing rights.
109
  
One might defend the Court by noting that it was not consulting state 
laws and judicial decisions as evidence of an existing or emerging national 
consensus, as it does in substantive due process and Eighth Amendment 
cases (id.).  In those contexts, the states are presumably data points of equal 
weight.  Instead, the Windsor Court was imagining the states as laboratories, 
a metaphor implying that there is a truth out there waiting to be 
discovered.
110
  In such a setting, it is coherent to conclude that even one state 
                                                 
107 See Resnik, supra note 26, at 367-68 (critiquing as “federalism-essentialism” the view “that 
rights have fixed relationships to jurisdictional lines,” because “competencies are always in motion, 
and in more than one direction, as the import of rights and the functions of government shift”; see also 
supra note 59 and accompanying text (citing scholarship that examines how perceived structural 
boundaries are altered by changes in rights consciousness). 
108 Important recent scholarship identifies what Heather Gerken has called “the discursive benefits 
of structure.”  Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview of the Nationalist 
School of Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2014); Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 
YALE L.J. 1958 (2014).  Gerken stresses how federalism and localism help frame political and 
constitutional debates and move them forward.  Her work focuses not just on the development of rights 
consciousness at the local level, but also on governance.  See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A New 
Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS (Spring 2012), 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/a-new-progressive-federalism.php?page=all (arguing that “racial 
minorities and dissenters can wield more electoral power at the local level than they do at the 
national,” and that “they can rule at the state and local level”).  For contributions developing that 
theme, see generally Heather K. Gerken, Lecture, Exist, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 
(2013); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 6 (2010); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative 
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1099 (2005); and Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting By Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).  
For related work by others, see infra note 111. 
109 See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 103, at 383-84 (recommending that the U.S. Supreme Court 
adopt the unanimous approach of state courts, which permits “reasonable” regulations of firearms). 
110 It may make more sense to imagine states as laboratories when there is disagreement over facts 
and means than when disagreements concern values and ends.  One does not typically enter a 
laboratory to discover what one’s values are.  That said, a greater awareness of facts can change 
values, at least over time.  For example, it seems likely that the more people realize they know gay 
people, the harder it is for them to stay morally opposed to homosexuality.  Similarly, people may 
become less resistant to same-sex marriage the more they observe that American society is not 
imperiled when certain states allow same-sex couples to marry. 
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has it right and forty-nine have it wrong.  Moreover, such a conclusion does 
not indicate the absence of a genuine commitment to federalism. 
Again, there is force to such an account, at least in principle; using select 
state developments in the service of living constitutionalism appears to 
constitute a coherent doctrinal move.  The question, however, is whether the 
account fully explains what the Court was doing in Windsor.
111
  The account 
may have incomplete explanatory power as applied to Windsor because the 
Court did more than ultimately side with a minority of states after due public 
deliberation:  it did not engage the vast majority of them.  It seemed 
uninterested in the “results” being produced in the majority of state “labs.”  
Given the Court’s failure to acknowledge what was going on in most states, 
there may be cause to question whether the Windsor Court was doing more 
than using federalism in the service of living constitutionalism.  The Court 
may have favored state power primarily because states like New York were 
acting to protect the dignity of same-sex couples.  In that case, the Court may 
have revealed more of a commitment to certain outcomes than a commitment 
to a structural arrangement that it hopes will produce the best outcomes—at 
least on balance and over the long run.  To be sure, structural commitments 
presumably exist, at least in part, to produce favorable outcomes.  There is a 
difference, however, between leveraging structure to secure good outcomes 
in general, and doing so to get the “right” outcome in a particular case. 
Put differently, the Court’s reasoning may signal a commitment to a 
certain conception of constitutional rights all the way down.  There is 
nothing wrong with such a conception, but it does not seem best described 
only in terms of federalism.  Something more was being expressed by the 
Windsor majority.   
 
B. Federalism in the Service of Equality 
 
The Windsor Court deployed federalism—specifically, concerns about 
federal overreach—as a one-way ratchet.  That is, the Court voiced 
federalism concerns only in the service of advancing equal citizenship for 
same-sex couples, not as a means of enforcing their continued inequality.  In 
that way, too, the Court used federalism as a tool to protect rights at the 
national level. 
                                                 
111 This Article analyzes what was likely moving the Windsor majority.  It does not suggest that 
work such as Heather Gerken’s, which emphasizes “the discursive benefits of structure,” see supra 
note 108, is less about federalism and more about something else.  For other work that stresses the 
discursive benefits of federalism and localism, see generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan 
Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); and Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong 
Mayors Empower Weak Cities?  On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 
2542 (2006). 
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To better understand the significance of what the Court did, first note 
what the Court did not do.  The Court did not hold, on specified federalism 
grounds, that governments may permit same-sex marriage but may not 
prohibit it.  Such a declaration would indeed amount to the use of federalism 
as a one-way ratchet.  It would not, however, be obviously defensible 
because the relevant federalism considerations would seem to cut both ways.  
Nor, to reiterate, did the Court invalidate Section 3 of DOMA as beyond 
the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Such a ruling may potentially 
have been principled, but it would not have amounted to the use of 
federalism as a one-way ratchet.  Equally unjustified by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause would be a federal Declaration of Marriage Equality Act 
(DOMEA) that defined “marriage” for all purposes under federal law as 
including same-sex marriages.
112
 
Instead, the Court expressed its concerns with the extraordinary breadth 
of DOMA by identifying non-decisive evidence of congressional animus, 
which violates the “basic due process and equal protection principles” 
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2675, 2693).  “DOMA, because of its reach and extent,” the Court 
wrote, “departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to 
define marriage” (id. 2692).  Twice quoting its decision in Romer v. Evans 
(517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court stated that “discriminations of an unusual 
character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they 
are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.”113 
The Court described DOMA as indeed “unusual,” as “a system-wide 
enactment with no identified connection to any particular area of federal 
law” (id. at 2694).  And it perceived not mere irrationality, but “strong 
evidence” of animus in the form of moral disapproval: 
DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of 
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here 
operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and 
responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their 
marriages.  This is strong evidence of a law having the 
purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.  The avowed 
purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to 
impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon 
                                                 
112 Such a statute, however, might be valid enforcement legislation under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, depending on how the Court was prepared to interpret Section One.  See City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (articulating the “congruence and proportionality” test, 
according to which the scope of the Court’s understanding of equal protection and due process 
principles assumes great significance in evaluating the constitutionality of Section Five legislation). 
113 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692, 2693 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 
(1928))). 
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all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
unquestioned authority of the States (id. at 2693). 
As Part II observed, however, the Court indicated that “discriminations of an 
unusual character” do not exclusively or even primarily “suggest careful 
consideration” (id. at 2692, 2693 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The 
Court also stressed ordinary evidence of animus, including statements of 
moral disapproval of homosexuality and same-sex marriage.  The Court did 
not place decisive emphasis on the lack of any distinctly federal (as opposed 
to state) interest in regulating same-sex marriage. 
The Court’s evidentiary use of federal overreach is innovative and 
intriguing.  Contrary to Madison’s theorizing in Federalist 10 and elsewhere 
that individual rights in the extended republic would be better protected at 
the national level than at the state level,
114
 the Court seemed to be suggesting 
that an unusual intervention by the federal government into an area long 
subject to significant regulation by the states may constitute evidence of an 
unconstitutional congressional purpose and thus a violation of individual 
constitutional rights.
115
  On that view, DOMA’s definition of “marriage” for 
more than 1,000 purposes under federal law
116—the vast majority of which 
Congress did not even consider in enacting DOMA—raises questions about 
Congress’s actual purposes in passing the provision, and raises further 
questions about the consistency of those purposes with constitutional 
principles of equal protection and substantive due process. 
The Court’s innovation, however, is also under-developed in the majority 
opinion and vulnerable in certain ways.  One potential problem with using 
concerns about federal overreach in the service of equality is that it is 
difficult to think of other examples involving over-broad federal laws.  If that 
is right, the Windsor Court’s approach may reflect more of a response to this 
case than an ongoing commitment to federalism. 
One might argue that a potential candidate is the federal Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004).  That statute, 
the argument would run, amounts to an unprecedented intrusion by the 
federal government into an area—abortion legislation—typically regulated 
by the states (subject to judicial protection of constitutional rights).  The 
federal ban on so-called partial birth abortion is valid Commerce Clause 
                                                 
114 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Madison) (arguing that a diverse, extended republic would best 
protect minority rights from majority tyranny). 
115 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, An Ephemeral Moment: Minimalism, Equality, and 
Federalism in the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 199, 209-10 
(2013) (cautiously defending the idea of “federalism [a]s a one-way ratchet toward liberty” while 
Windsor was pending before the Court). 
116 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (identifying the number of federal statutory 
provisions to which Section 3’s definition of marriage applied). 
19-May-14 FEDERALISM AS A WAY STATION 39 
 
 
legislation,
117
 but the lack of any apparent need for novel regulatory action at 
the federal level may constitute a red flag that should have triggered 
skepticism about the purposes of the federal intervention.  As it turned out, 
the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart (127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)) deferred much 
more substantially to congressional factfinding on the medical necessity of 
the banned procedure than it did to state factfinding when it reviewed a 
similar state ban seven years earlier (see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 
(2000))—even though the medical evidence had not changed in any 
significant respect in the intervening years.
118
 
The abortion example, however, may just suggest another vulnerability 
of the Windsor Court’s approach:  it may have less to do with federalism, and 
more to do with constitutional rights.  Imagine a novel federal law, enacted 
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, that prohibited states from 
imposing various restrictions on abortion.  Such a law might be as unusual as 
the 2003 federal statute, and it might initially raise a constitutional red flag 
on that ground.  But the red flag would quickly come down because the law 
could not plausibly be viewed as undermining any judicially declared 
constitutional rights.  In that case, a commitment to certain substantive rights 
appears to be doing the analytical work, not a commitment to a certain view 
of the constitutional structure.  Unless the Court can identify a case in which 
federalism concerns render unconstitutional an otherwise permissible law 
that adversely affects equality or liberty interests—and Windsor does not 
appear to have been such a case—its appeal to federalism seems somewhat 
strained.  
Finally, the Windsor Court’s evidentiary use of federalism relies on 
notions of “unusual” federal action and “traditional subjects of state 
concern.”  Those notions ought to be viewed with skepticism, as illustrated 
by the sheer number of presumably constitutional federal laws implicated by 
DOMA’s definition of marriage.  It is generally unworkable and undesirable 
for constitutional analysis to turn on whether Congress is regulating 
“traditional subjects of state regulation.”119  In general, Congress’s 
enumerated powers are best understood to confer upon Congress broad 
authority to solve national problems, including by intervening as necessary in 
such “traditional” areas of state regulation as criminal law, education, and 
                                                 
117 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (holding that the Commerce Clause 
allows Congress to regulate economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce in the 
aggregate).  But cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(stressing “that whether the [Partial-Birth Abortion Ban] Act constitutes a permissible exercise of 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause is not before the Court,” because “[t]he parties did not 
raise or brief that issue; it is outside the question presented; and the lower courts did not address it”). 
118 Of course, the composition of the Presidency and the Court had changed.    
119 For a discussion, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Distinguishing the “Truly National” from the 
“Truly Local”: Customary Allocation, Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 DUKE L.J. 797 
(2012) (symposium on law and custom). 
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family law,
120
 the last category of which includes the law of “domestic 
relations.”121  Constitutional interpreters should be less concerned about 
whether the states have traditionally regulated a certain subject matter or 
whether federal action is unprecedented, and they should be more concerned 
about whether federal intervention presently is justified and sensible.  
Federal intervention may be justified and sensible because the problem at 
issue spills across state borders, or because equal citizenship values are at 
stake.
122
 
The foregoing observations are not meant to reject decisively any role for 
the use of federalism concerns as a rights-protecting ratchet.  That facet of 
the Windsor Court’s response to Section 3 of DOMA was creative and 
intriguing.  But the approach is sufficiently vulnerable and unnecessary that 
it raises the question of why the Court elected to employ it.  To answer that 
question, it may help to take a step back and consider the Court’s opinion in 
Windsor in a broader context, one that seeks to understand the processes of 
constitutional change.  
 
C. A Dynamic Reading of Windsor 
 
To reiterate, why did the Court qualify a strong endorsement of 
constitutional equality for same-sex couples by stressing state control over 
domestic relations, thereby potentially permitting others to draw a distinction 
between discrimination against same-sex couples and discrimination against 
same-sex marriages?  Why was the Court selective in using state-level 
developments in the service of living constitutionalism, validating the 
choices of the minority of states that allow same-sex marriage but not the 
decisions of the majority of states that prohibit it?  Why did the Court, for the 
first time, use concerns about federal overreach as evidence of 
unconstitutional animus?  There may be no fully satisfactory answers to 
those questions if one thinks about constitutional doctrine statically—that is, 
as coherent and fully developed when considered at a single point in time. 
The above questions may seem less perplexing, however, if one thinks 
about doctrine dynamically—that is, as moving in history and changing over 
time.  When doctrine is considered from that perspective, it becomes 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 86, at 172 (“[T]he federal government has regulated family law 
since at least Reconstruction, and it has regulated education heavily in the last fifty years. And, of 
course, the federal government has attacked crime since the beginning of the Republic and with 
increasing frequency in the twentieth century.” (footnote omitted)); see generally Hasday, supra note 
55 (noting that the federal government has been significantly involved in regulating the family since 
Reconstruction). 
121 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (describing “family law,” 
including “marriage, divorce, and childrearing,” as an “area[] of traditional state regulation”). 
122 For a discussion, see generally Siegel, supra note 119. 
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apparent that there are periods of doctrinal stability and periods of doctrinal 
change.  It also becomes apparent that doctrine may look different at those 
different times.  In periods of transition, when the country and the law are in 
flux, the Court’s doctrine may be in conversation with other participants in 
the constitutional system, including courts, politicians, social movements, 
and citizens. 
In several respects, the majority opinion in Windsor is what constitutional 
doctrine looks like when it is in conversation.  In finding a Fifth Amendment 
violation, for example, the opinion did not announce a level of scrutiny.  
Instead, it implausibly concluded that Section 3 of DOMA flunked even 
rational basis review notwithstanding asserted federal interests in uniformity 
and stability, which were conceivable if not actual.
123
  In that regard, the 
opinion is like the Court’s 1971 opinion in Reed v. Reed (404 U.S. 71 
(1971)), which purported to apply only rational basis review when, for the 
first time in American history, it invalidated a sex classification as violating 
the Equal Protection Clause.  Two years later, four Justices adopted strict 
scrutiny for sex classifications (see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973)), and three years after that, the Court settled upon intermediate 
scrutiny (see Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).  In Romer v. Evans as 
well (517 U.S. 620 (1996)), the Court purported to apply only rational basis 
review, even though many laws express moral disapproval of a disfavored 
group yet survive rational basis review.
124
  Similarly, the Court in Lawrence 
v. Texas found a violation of substantive due process without declaring the 
existence of a fundamental right subject to heightened scrutiny (539 U.S. 558 
(2003)).  Windsor is thus not a one-off; it is, rather, an example of a more 
general phenomenon, which becomes apparent once it is understood that 
legal doctrine can be used as a way station toward a particular later 
resolution.
125
  
There are several methods that the Court may employ to use legal 
doctrine as a way station.  As just noted, one familiar technique is to 
invalidate legislation while purporting to apply only rational basis review.  
Another well-known device, explored below in an analysis of the Court’s 
decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry (133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)), is to apply 
principles of justiciability so as to avoid deciding the merits.
126
  A third, less 
                                                 
123 See supra note 73 (noting that the Windsor Court rejected or ignored asserted federal interests 
in uniformity and stability). 
124 For a discussion, see Franklin, supra note 10, at *29.    
125 There are unsuccessful attempts at doctrinal development, too.  The path of constitutional law 
is determined by contingency, not teleology.  For example, whether and when the Court holds that 
states may not ban same-sex marriage will depend upon, among other things, the continuation of 
current popular trends, the timing of vacancies on the Court, and the political party that controls the 
White House and the Senate when those vacancies occur. 
126 See BICKEL, supra note 24, at 111-98 (advocating use of the “passive virtues”). 
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well-recognized method potentially allows the Court to send a stronger signal 
about its view of the merits than those other two.  It is to invoke the 
rhetorical resources of federalism in the service of nudging the national 
conversation in the direction of enhanced equality and liberty. 
In American politics, federalism can serve as a temporizing way station.  
Politicians, for example, may argue for leaving certain controversial 
questions to the states in order to avoid having to make a firm substantive 
commitment one way or the other at the national level for the time being.  A 
historical case in point was the idea of “popular sovereignty” as a solution to 
the politically explosive question of slavery in the territories.  In 1848, 
popular sovereignty was associated primarily with Michigan Senator Lewis 
Cass.  He won the Democratic nomination for President over James 
Buchanan because the idea of popular sovereignty was, at that point, 
sufficiently acceptable to a sufficient number of southerners.
127
  “The 
Democratic Party,” James McPherson explains, “continued the tradition of 
trying to preserve intersectional unity by avoiding a firm position on slavery” 
(id.).  
Senator Stephen Douglas also embraced popular sovereignty as the 
preferred approach to resolving the issue of slavery in the territories.  In his 
view, the Dred Scott Court correctly invalidated the Missouri Compromise, 
“there being no power delegated to Congress in the Constitution authorizing 
Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territories.”128  Douglas publicly declared 
that “he cared not whether slavery was voted down or up in Kansas—his 
concern was that Kansas have a fair vote.”129  That compromise position 
became unacceptable to Southerners by the end of the 1850s,
130
 especially 
after Douglas led the effort to prevent the admission of Kansas as a slave 
state.
131
 
Lincoln, too, recoiled at the idea of a federalism solution to a question of 
such great moral and political moment.  In his view, Douglas’s “care not” 
policy had promoted the evil of slavery’s expansion.  By way of response, 
Lincoln insisted that the country required the election of leaders who were 
prepared to make the correct substantive commitment at the national level.  
He championed Republicans, “whose hearts are in the work—who do care 
for the result,” who “consider slavery a moral, social, and political wrong,” 
                                                 
127 See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 58 (1988). 
128 Stephen A. Douglas, The Dividing Line Between Federal and Local Authority: Popular 
Sovereignty in the Territories, HARPER’S MAGAZINE 529-30 (1859), 
http://harpers.org/sponsor/balvenie/stephen-douglas.1.html.    
129 MCPHERSON, supra note 127, at 181. 
130 Johannsen, supra note 2, at 34 (“By the end of the 1850’s, . . . Douglas’ doctrine [of popular 
sovereignty] was regarded as rank heresy in the South and as inimical to the section’s interests.”). 
131 See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 40-41 (2006). 
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and who will combat “the modern Democratic idea that slavery is as good as 
freedom, and ought to have room for expansion over all the continent.”132 
Unlike Lincoln, Douglas made use of federalism’s temporizing function; 
he appeared to use federalism as a way station in the sense meant by this 
Article.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “way station” as “[a]n 
intermediate station on a railway route, a way-side station.”133  The OED 
notes that the first recorded use of the term occurred in 1850, in the annual 
report of a railroad corporation (id.).  Similarly, the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines “way station” first as “a station set between principal 
stations on a line of travel (as a railroad),” and second as “an intermediate 
stopping place.”134  Way stations are located between main stations, and one 
knows the identity of the next main station in the line based on the direction 
in which the train is going when it arrives at the way station.  Douglas was 
motivated not only to hold the country (and the northern and southern wings 
of the Democratic Party) together through compromise.  He also believed 
that popular sovereignty would result in the territories being controlled by 
free state settlers.  As Mark Graber explains, Douglas made “repeated 
assertions that popular sovereignty was the least controversial means for 
obtaining free states.”135  In Douglas’s own words, “the people would decide 
against slavery if left to settle the question for themselves.”136  Accordingly, 
Douglas was trying to nudge national politics in the direction of slavery’s 
containment while simultaneously preventing dissolution of the union. 
Notably, in the early 1850s “Southern doubts and fears had been partially 
allayed by the ambiguity of popular sovereignty itself.”137  Whereas Douglas 
believed that the doctrine empowered territories qua territories to decide for 
themselves whether to allow slavery, many Southerners equated popular 
sovereignty with noninterference with slavery, whether by a territorial 
legislature or by Congress (id.).  “Only when a territory moved into 
                                                 
132 Abraham Lincoln, quoted in MCPHERSON, supra note 127, at 181-82 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City (1860), in 3 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Roy P, Basler ed., (1953) (“Wrong as we think slavery is, 
we can yet afford to let it alone where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its 
actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent it, allow it to spread into the 
National Territories, and to overrun us here in these Free States?”). 
133 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/226520 (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2014). 
134 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/way 
%20station (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). 
135 GRABER, supra note 131, at 43. 
136 Douglas, quoted in Johannsen, supra note 2, at 35.  See id. (“Popular sovereignty, he was 
convinced, would extend freedom, not slavery, at the same time that it broadened the limits of self-
government for those who lived in the territories. Territorial developments bore out Douglas’ 
prediction, so that by 1860 even many Republicans recognized the value of his position.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
137 Id. at 35.    
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statehood, they maintained, could the slavery question be decided” (id.). 
Accordingly, popular sovereignty “meant different things to Douglas and to 
the South; its ambiguity was carefully preserved, . . . allowing what later was 
termed a ‘double construction’” (id.).  As noted at the outset of this Article, 
one Southern critic—James M. Mason of Virginia—would later say of 
Douglas:  “[Y]ou promised us bread, and you have given us a stone; you 
promised us a fish, and you have given us a serpent; we thought you had 
given us a substantial right; and you have given us the most evanescent 
shadow and delusion” (id. 37).  Other Southern leaders ultimately declared:  
“no Douglas dodges—no double constructions” (id. at 40). 
In more recent times as well, national politicians have sought temporary, 
federalism resolutions of divisive issues; they have not invoked federalism 
merely in the service of resistance or an indefinite compromise.
138
  For 
example, it is well known that many opponents of same-sex marriage have 
invoked federalism themes.
139
  It is less well known that some politicians 
who support same-sex marriage have invoked federalism frames as a way 
station in urging that regulation of the issue should be left to the states for the 
time being.
140
   
For example, in the months before the 2012 Presidential Election, 
President Obama appeared to make temporary use of federalism’s 
temporizing function when discussing same-sex marriage.  In May of 2012, 
he told ABC’s Robin Roberts that he had “evolved” to the point of 
supporting same-sex marriage.
141
  After making that announcement on 
national television, he went on to explain that he viewed the issue through 
the lens of federalism: 
What you’re seeing is, I think, states working through this 
issue — in fits and starts, all across the country. Different 
communities are arriving at different conclusions, at different 
                                                 
138 In the abortion context, by contrast, politicians today tend to invoke federalism to take a 
decisive stand against continued judicial protection of abortion rights.  See, e.g., Michael James, Rick 
Perry Categorizes Abortion as a States’ Rights Issue, ABC NEWS, July 27, 2011, 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/07/rick-perry-categorizes-abortion-as-a-states-rights-issue/ 
(“Despite holding personal pro-life beliefs, Texas Gov. Rick Perry categorized abortion as a states’ 
rights issue today, saying that if Roe v. Wade was overturned, it should be up to the states to decide the 
legality of the procedure.”).   
139 See, e.g., Maggie Haberman, Romney Calls Gay Marriage a “State Issue,” POLITICO, May 12, 
2012, http://www.politico.com/blogs/burns-haberman/2012/05/romney-calls-gay-marriage-a-state-
issue-123041.html. 
140 See, e.g., Liz Marlantes, Hillary Clinton Backs Gay Marriage.  A Sign She’s Serious About 
2016?, DC DECODER, March 18, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-
Wire/2013/0318/Hillary-Clinton-backs-gay-marriage.-A-sign-she-s-serious-about-2016-video (“When 
Mrs. Clinton ran for president in 2008, her official position (like Mr. Obama’s) was to favor civil 
unions, not gay marriage, saying she thought the matter should be left to the states.”). 
141 Reid J. Epstein, Supreme Court, Like Obama, Leaves Marriage to States, POLITICO, June 26, 
2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/prop-8-ruling-california-93458.html. 
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times. And I think that’s a healthy process and a healthy 
debate. And I continue to believe that this is an issue that is 
going to be worked out at the local level, because historically, 
this has not been a federal issue, what’s recognized as a 
marriage (id.). 
That interview took place one day after voters in North Carolina 
overwhelmingly approved Amendment 1, a constitutional amendment 
prohibiting same-sex marriage (N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6).  At the time, 
“Obama declined to second-guess the state’s voters.”142 
By contrast, on the day that the Court decided Windsor, the President 
spoke in the register of individual rights, not federalism.  “This was 
discrimination enshrined in law,” he said of Section 3 of DOMA (id.).  “It 
treated loving, committed gay and lesbian couples as a separate and lesser 
class of people.  The Supreme Court has righted that wrong, and our country 
is better off for it” (id.).  Obama even invoked the Declaration of 
Independence for good measure:  “We are a people who declared that we are 
all created equal—and the love we commit to one another must be equal as 
well” (id.).  The President’s more recent, equality-infused understanding of 
the issue of same-sex marriage seemed to have little to do with federalism.  
The President spoke disapprovingly of DOMA’s discrimination against 
same-sex couples, not its discrimination against state-sanctioned same-sex 
marriages.
143
 
The use of federalism as a way station is distinct from the expression of 
normative ambivalence, which politicians and citizens alike may voice by 
appealing to federalism values.  For instance, according to the New York 
Times/CBS News poll of June 6, 2013, “[a] solid majority of Americans 
opposes a broad national right to same-sex marriage, saying the power to 
legalize gay unions should rest with the states.”144  The poll so found “even 
as most support marriage equality for gay people” (id.).  Based on how the 
polling data continue to trend, one can predict that Americans will eventually 
endorse a broad national right to same-sex marriage, just as they endorse the 
                                                 
142 Epstein, supra note 141. 
143 As the Republican nominee for president in 2012, Mitt Romney used federalism rhetoric in a 
different way to explain his position on health care reform.  Perhaps bowing to political necessity, he 
stressed constitutional limits on Congress’s enumerated powers to reconcile his support of an 
“individual mandate” in Massachusetts with his opposition to a similar federal mandate.  See, e.g., Paul 
West, Romney Tells Virginians Healthcare Is “States’ Rights” Issue, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/26/news/la-pn-romney-tells-virginians-healthcare-is-states-rights-
issue-20120626 (“‘I’m going to get rid of the cloud of Obamacare and get us back to personal 
responsibility and states’ rights as it relates to health care . . . .’”). 
144 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Same-Sex Marriage Is Seen in Poll as an Issue for the States, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/politics/states-should-decide-gay-
marriage-poll-finds.html?_r=0. 
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broad national right to interracial marriage that the Court vindicated at long 
last in Loving.
145
 
In contrast to expressions of normative ambivalence, Windsor illustrates 
that courts, like Presidents, may use the rhetorical resources of federalism as 
a way station.  And it is fascinating to examine how the Windsor Court used 
federalism as a way station toward greater equality for same-sex couples and 
their families.  With that objective in mind, it is instructive to revisit the three 
questions flagged at the beginning of this Part. 
First, why did the Court qualify a strong endorsement of constitutional 
equality for same-sex couples by stressing state control of domestic relations, 
thereby potentially permitting other courts to distinguish discrimination 
against same-sex couples from discrimination against same-sex marriages? 
From the perspective of a Court that is in conversation with the country, the 
distinction may make good sense.  From that vantage point, the Court’s 
references to state conferrals of dignity may reflect a statesmanlike effort to 
“persuad[e] before it attempts to coerce.”146  The Court may have wanted to 
leave open the possibility that the implications of the decision are limited, 
thereby giving resistant judges and litigants some ability to distinguish 
Windsor in constitutional litigation over state bans on same-sex marriage. 
As explained in Part II.B, however, the Court’s references to state control 
over domestic relations were sufficiently qualified as to render the possibility 
of limited implications an improbability.  Justice Kennedy appeared to write 
the Court’s opinion affirmatively to encourage constitutional challenges to 
state bans on same-sex marriage and to increase the chances that they will 
succeed—but not yet to require their success.  Perhaps the Justices in the 
majority, like the Justices in Brown, have already made up their minds about 
the constitutionality of state bans.
147
  Or perhaps they are skeptical of them 
                                                 
145 In a nationwide CBS News Poll conducted from July 18, 2013 through July 22, 2013, fifty-five 
percent of respondents opined that it should be legal for same-sex couples to marry.  Thirty-nine 
percent opined that it should not be legal, and six percent were unsure. POLLINGREPORT.COM, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).  See also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 
IN GAY MARRIAGE DEBATE, BOTH SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS SEE LEGAL RECOGNITION AS 
“INEVITABLE,” June 6, 2013, at 1, http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-06-
13%20LGBT%20General%20Public%20Release.pdf (“[N]early three-quarters of Americans – 72% – 
say that legal recognition of same-sex marriage is ‘inevitable.’ This includes 85% of gay marriage 
supporters, as well as 59% of its opponents.”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE 
ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 193-207 (2013) 
(canvassing the evidence and concluding that same-sex marriage is inevitable in the United States). 
146 BICKEL, supra note 24, at 28 (observing that “the Court has ways of persuading before it 
attempts to coerce”). 
147 In Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), the Warren Court dismissed an appeal 
challenging Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage, despite an apparent absence of discretion to 
dismiss, just after deciding Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  The Brown Court 
itself knew where it was headed (that is, invalidating all de jure racial segregation), but for reasons of 
legitimacy and social cohesion declined to fully disclose the destination by focusing on the special 
importance of public education.  The per curiam opinions extending Brown to parks, swimming pools, 
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but have not yet made up their minds completely.  Either way, they appear 
self-consciously to be moving in a particular direction—and urging the 
country to continue moving in the same direction.   
An increasing number of litigants and lower courts are doing just that.  
When the Court heard oral argument in Windsor in March 2013, same-sex 
marriage was allowed in nine states and the District of Columbia.  If recent 
federal district court decisions invalidating Utah’s,148 Oklahoma’s,149 
Virginia’s,150 Texas’s,151 and Michigan’s152 bans on same-sex marriage 
survive appellate review, the number of states allowing such marriages will 
have more than doubled, to twenty-two.
153
  Since the Court handed down 
Windsor, there is, or has been, litigation concerning state bans on same-sex 
marriage and related issues in federal and state courts all around the 
country.
154
  Not all of those challenges will prevail, at least initially,
155
 but an 
increasing number already have.
156
  Over the next year or two, some more 
socially conservative or cautious judges may uphold certain state bans on 
                                                                                                                             
etc., followed in short order, but the Court’s invalidation of Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage was 
delayed another thirteen years.  See supra note 56 (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
148 See Kitchen v. Herbert, 2013 WL 6697874 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013). 
149 See Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 2014 WL 116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014).    
150 See Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-395 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014).    
151 See De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014). 
152 See Deboer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014).  See also Bourke v. 
Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) (holding that Kentucky’s denial of 
recognition for same-sex marriages performed out of state violates the federal Equal Protection 
Clause); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 2013 WL 6726688, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2013) (holding 
that Ohio’s denial of recognition for same-sex marriages performed out of state violates the federal 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as applied to death certificates). 
153 See Erik Eckholm, Oklahoma’s Ban on Gay Marriage Is Unconstitutional, Judge Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2014, at A15; Adam Liptak, Utah Ruling Means No Respite for the Supreme Court on 
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2013, at A1.  See National Map, MarriageEqualityUSA, 
http://www.marriageequality.org/national-map (updated Jan. 7, 2014) (“Although 38% of Americans 
live in 18 states that have adopted full, state-level equality (CA, CT, DC, DE, HI, IA, IL, MA, MD, 
ME, MN, NH, NM, NJ, NY, RI, VT, WA), and more live in cities, counties, or states with partial 
equality (mainly CO, NV, OR, WI), 51% live in 34 jurisdictions that still ban all types of unions except 
one-man-one-woman couples.”).  MarriageEqualityUSA includes DC in its count but excludes Utah, 
Oklahoma, Virginia, Texas, and Michigan. 
154 See supra note 3 (noting the forty-two states in which there presently are federal or state 
lawsuits bearing on the issue of marriage equality).  
155 See, e.g., Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nv. 2012) (upholding the state’s ban on 
same-sex marriage).  To be clear, however, this case was decided before the Supreme Court handed 
down Windsor. 
156 For example, same-sex marriage is now permitted in New Jersey and New Mexico in light of 
recent decisions by their state supreme courts.  In New Jersey, the state declined to appeal a state 
Superior Court decision requiring the state to allow same-sex couples to marry once the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable probability that the state would win on the merits.  
See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 2013 WL 5687193 (N.J. Oct. 18, 2013).  In New Mexico, the State 
Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution requires the state “to 
allow same-gender couples to marry and [to] extend to them the rights, protections, and responsibilities 
that derive from civil marriage under New Mexico law.”  Griego v. Oliver, 2013 WL 6670704, slip op. 
at 9 (N.M. Dec. 19, 2013). 
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same-sex marriage by distinguishing Windsor on the grounds advanced by 
Chief Justice Roberts and discussed in Part I.  But one can also expect other 
such bans to fall, generating splits of authority and returning the question to 
the Court—sooner than the Windsor majority may wish in light of the 
Nevada appeal currently pending before the Ninth Circuit on an expedited 
basis,
157
 and the Utah and Oklahoma appeals currently pending before the 
Tenth Circuit.
158
 
Turning to the second question, why was the Court selective in using 
state practices in the service of living constitutionalism, discussing and then 
validating the choices of the minority of states that allow same-sex marriage 
but not mentioning the decisions of the majority of states that do not?  Part 
III.A suggested that the Court’s examination of state developments might be 
understood as a coherent doctrinal move on its own terms.  But Part III.A 
also suggested that such an interpretation raises difficult questions about the 
Court’s partiality in looking to only certain states—questions that it did not 
acknowledge, let alone address.   
From a dynamic vantage point, viewing that part of the Court’s opinion 
as only a doctrinal move may miss the big picture.  The Court’s invocation of 
state developments is probably better understood as a signal from the Court 
to states and courts to continue deliberating about same-sex marriage—and 
to deliberate with a thumb on the scale in favor of same-sex couples who 
want to marry.  By using federalism as a way station in that manner, the 
Court was able to intimate its view of the merits—without yet committing to 
that view—to a greater extent than it would have been able to accomplish 
merely by declining to announce the level of scrutiny or misapplying the 
justiciability doctrines.  It communicated its view of the merits by stressing 
the minority of states that have allowed same-sex marriage and ignoring the 
majority that have not. 
Third, why did the Court, for the first time, use concerns about federal 
overreach as—and only as—non-decisive evidence of unconstitutional 
animus?  It makes good sense if the objective is to use federalism as a way 
station toward greater equality for same-sex couples and their children.  By 
avoiding a ruling based decisively on federalism concerns, the Court was 
able to cast doubt upon the constitutionality of at least some state bans on 
same-sex marriage.  The Court was also able to avoid indicting a potential 
                                                 
157 See Denniston, supra note 3 (noting that “the Nevada case in the Ninth Circuit is one of the 
furthest along among cases unfolding in federal appeals courts in the wake of [Windsor],” and that the 
court of appeals “has agreed to expedite the hearing date for this case, and has allowed Nevada 
officials to withdraw their brief defending the state ban”). 
158 Political scientist Martin Shapiro once cautioned those “fascinated by the Court as a political 
actor” not to forget “that it is also acted upon politically.”  Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 603 
(1963). 
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future federal law of equivalent breadth to DOMA that will define 
“marriage” to include same-sex marriages.  Such a law might be just as 
“unusual” as DOMA from the perspective of Article I, Section 8, but it could 
not plausibly be interpreted as violating the Fifth Amendment by having the 
purpose, effect, or social meaning of demeaning gay people.
159
  By regarding 
federalism concerns as non-decisive to the proper resolution of the case, the 
Court was able to use those concerns in—and only in—the service of 
equality.  At the same time, by declaring federalism concerns pertinent and 
thus avoiding a ruling based only on constitutional rights conventionally 
conceived, the Court was able to avoid committing itself to invalidating all 
state bans on same-sex marriage at this time. 
 
D. Why the Way Station? 
 
The foregoing reading of the Court’s opinion has begged an important 
question:  why would the Windsor majority want to use federalism as a way 
station toward greater equality for gay Americans, as opposed to simply 
resolving the ultimate question of equality?  The opinion reflects the fact that 
there are not yet settled doctrines in this area of the law, but why did the 
Windsor majority elect not to settle them? 
One possible and perhaps popular answer points to the author of the 
majority opinion in Windsor, Anthony Kennedy.  On that view, the Court’s 
opinion simply reflects the moral and constitutional ambivalence about 
same-sex marriage of the Court’s “swing Justice.”160  One potential problem 
with such an explanation, however, is that Kennedy may no longer be the 
median Justice in this area of constitutional law.  That inference can 
plausibly be drawn from the voting alignment in Hollingsworth v Perry (133 
S. Ct. 2652 (2013)), the companion case to Windsor that presented both a 
threshold question for federal courts enthusiasts and a merits question 
potentially for all the marbles in the constitutional debate over same-sex 
marriage. 
Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution to provide that “[o]nly 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California” 
(CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5).  Fracturing 5-4, the Court in Hollingsworth held 
that the official proponents of Proposition 8 lacked standing under Article III, 
Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution to appeal the district court’s order 
declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutional and enjoining public officials from 
enforcing it (133 S. Ct. at 2668).  Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority 
opinion, which was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.  
                                                 
159 See supra note 112 (noting that such a federal statute might constitute valid enforcement 
legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
160 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 9 (opining that “Justice Kennedy was the swing vote”). 
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Justice Kennedy wrote the dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices 
Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor.  Roberts reasoned that the Court had “never 
before upheld the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality of 
a state statute when state officials have chosen not to” (id.).  Kennedy 
thought “the Court’s reasoning does not take into account the fundamental 
principles or the practical dynamics of the initiative system in California, 
which uses this mechanism to control and to bypass public officials—the 
same officials who would not defend the initiative, an injury the Court now 
leaves unremedied” (id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
On first glance, it might appear that someone randomly assigned the 
Justices to those two coalitions.  On second glance, there is meaning to be 
made.  In Hollingsworth, Justice Kennedy seemed prepared to decide 
whether Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause or the Due 
Process Clause notwithstanding his suggestion at oral argument that the 
Court should not have taken the case.
161
  He may not have been eager to 
decide the merits, but he appeared prepared to do so.  (One might object that 
Kennedy merely voiced his disagreement with the majority without stating 
what he was prepared to do instead.  But if he had preferred to dismiss the 
case as improvidently granted instead of deciding the merits, he likely would 
have said so even at the cost of sacrificing a wholly united front among the 
dissenters.)  Given the equality commitments in his Windsor opinion, it is 
unlikely that he would have voted to uphold Proposition 8.  One cannot 
know for certain whether he would have endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s one-
state solution,
162
 the federal government’s eight-state solution,163 or the gay 
plaintiffs’ fifty-state solution.164  One suspects, however, that he would not 
have gone all the way; at oral argument, he described the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion as “very narrow” in suggesting that the Court should proceed with 
more caution than the plaintiffs were urging.
165
  Even so, he seemed to think 
that the Court, having agreed to take the case, should address the merits.  The 
                                                 
161 See Tr. of Oral Argument, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), at 48 (“I just 
wonder if -- if the case was properly granted.”). 
162 See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause 
requires the state to have a legitimate reason for withdrawing a right or benefit from one group but not 
others, whether or not it was required to confer that right or benefit in the first place.”). 
163 See Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144) (“Proposition 8’s denial of marriage to 
same-sex couples, particularly where California at the same time grants same-sex partners all the 
substantive rights of marriage, violates equal protection.”); id. (“Seven other states provide, through 
comprehensive domestic partnership or civil union laws, same-sex couples rights substantially similar 
to those available to married couples, yet still restrict marriage to opposite sex couples . . . .”).  
164 See Brief for Respondents at 13, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144) 
(“Proposition 8 is an arbitrary, irrational, and discriminatory measure that denies gay men and lesbians 
their fundamental right to marry in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.”). 
165 Tr. of Oral Argument, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), at 48. 
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only Justice in the Windsor majority who agreed with him was Justice 
Sotomayor. 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan defected from the Windsor 
majority coalition, voting not to reach the merits in Hollingsworth.  Because 
the Court fractured 5-4, each of their votes was essential to the outcome.  It is 
possible that the split reflected just a genuine disagreement about Article III 
standing doctrine.  In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
166
 Justice 
Ginsburg, in her opinion for a unanimous Court, expressed skepticism about 
the standing of initiative sponsors to defend the constitutionality of initiatives 
on appeal.
167
  Popular initiatives may raise distinct legal concerns for 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan; the standing of the official sponsors of such 
initiatives to appeal when government officials refuse to do so may raise 
constitutional concerns for those Justices that do not track their general views 
on Article III standing. 
That said, the standing question in Hollingsworth was sufficiently 
difficult, the dicta in Arizonans for Official English were sufficiently 
distinguishable,
168
 and the general views of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan on Article III standing are sufficiently permissive,
169
 that one suspects 
one or more of them were disinclined to reach the merits, at least in part, for 
prudential reasons.  Mindful, perhaps, of the direction in which public 
opinion continues to trend,
170
 they may have been loath to shift the national 
conversation from substance to process—from the merits to the propriety of 
the Court’s having decided the merits for the country.  Justice Kennedy 
presumably spoke at the post-argument Conference in Hollingsworth before 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.
171
  “Of course,” he wrote in dissent, 
“the Court must be cautious before entering a realm of controversy where the 
legal community and society at large are still formulating ideas and 
approaches to a most difficult subject” (Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2674). 
                                                 
166 520 U.S. 43 (1996). 
167 See id. at 66 (expressing “grave doubts” about the standing of the initiative sponsors to appeal, 
but not deciding the question). 
168 Compare Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65 (“[W]e are aware of no Arizona law 
appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, 
the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.”), with Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 
(Cal. 2011) (“In a postelection challenge to a voter-approved initiative measure, the official proponents 
of the initiative are authorized under California law to appear and assert the state’s interest in the 
initiative’s validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure when the public officials who 
ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so.”). 
169 See, e.g., Az. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (holding that 
taxpayers lack Article III standing to bring Establishment Clause challenges to tax credits, as opposed 
to government spending).  Justice Kagan wrote a blistering dissent, which was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. 
170 See supra note 145 (citing polling data). 
171 At Conference, the Justices speak in order of seniority.  In Hollingsworth, however, it is not 
publicly known whether each Justice addressed both justiciability and the merits as an initial matter, or 
whether each addressed only justiciability and did not discuss the merits. 
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“But,” he insisted, “it is shortsighted to misconstrue principles of 
justiciability to avoid that subject” (id.).  He thereby chided some of his 
colleagues in the majority for avoiding the merits for prudential reasons.  
There is, as noted in the previous section, nothing new about using standing 
doctrine for such purposes.
172
 
Justice Ginsburg may have already made up her mind on whether state 
bans on same-sex marriage violate the Constitution.  She recently became the 
first Justice to officiate a same-sex wedding ceremony.
173
  Her cause for 
caution may lie elsewhere than the legal difficulty of the merits question.  
While Windsor and Hollingsworth were pending, she spoke publicly about 
the political backlash that she believes the Court needlessly caused by acting 
decisively in Roe v. Wade.
174
  It does not matter whether she is right about 
Roe,
175
 or whether a Supreme Court decision invalidating some or all state 
bans on same-sex marriage would be about as likely to cause political 
backlash as Roe.
176
  What matters is what she believes.
177
 
True, standing was not the only “way out” if certain Justices were 
looking for one.  They might have attended to concerns about judicial 
overreach on the merits by endorsing either the Ninth Circuit’s one-state 
                                                 
172 See, e.g., supra note 24 (citing the relevant work of Alexander Bickel).  
173 See Gay Vows, With Ginsburg Officiating, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2013, at A11, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/us/gay-vows-with-ginsburg-officiating.html?_r=1& (“Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg will preside over a same-sex wedding on Saturday in what is believed to be a 
first for a member of the Supreme Court.”). 
174 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Ginsburg, Roe v. Wade and Same-Sex 
Marriage, HUFFINGTON POST (May 12, 2013, 11:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-
stone/justice-ginsburg-roe-v-wa_b_3264307.html (recounting the public conversation he had with 
Ginsburg the previous day, and noting that her “critique of Roe is especially interesting at this moment 
because it has implications for the same-sex marriage cases currently pending before the Court”).    
175 Several scholars have rejected the conventional wisdom that Roe in particular was responsible 
for the backlash associated with the liberalization of abortion restrictions.  See generally David J. 
Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833 
(1999); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Feature, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions 
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011). 
176 For an argument that “a broad marriage-equality ruling by the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth 
probably would not have fomented a backlash as extreme as those ignited by Brown and Roe,” see 
Klarman, supra note 10, at 143-54. 
177 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. 
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 376, 381 (1985) (opining that “Roe v. Wade sparked public opposition and 
academic criticism, in part, I believe, because the Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and 
presented an incomplete justification for its action,” and that “[t]he sweep and detail of the opinion 
stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and state 
legislatures”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199 
(1992) (Madison Lecture) (“A less encompassing Roe, one that merely struck down the extreme Texas 
law and went no further on that day, I believe . . . might have served to reduce rather than to fuel 
controversy.”).  See also Jeffrey Toobin, Heavyweight, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/03/11/130311fa_fact_toobin (“When Ginsburg and I spoke 
in her chambers, she noted her Madison Lecture’s relevance for major cases before the Supreme Court 
this term: ‘I’m sure you’re aware that what I said in that Madison Lecture is being trotted out now in 
the same-sex-marriage issue.’”). 
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solution
178
 or the Solicitor General’s eight-state solution.179  Those 
approaches, however, are sufficiently difficult to defend that no Justice other 
than possibly Kennedy
180
 expressed sympathy for either of them at oral 
argument.  The Ninth Circuit’s approach does not convincingly explain why 
withdrawal of a right or benefit from some people triggers greater judicial 
scrutiny than declining to extend the right or benefit to those people as an 
original matter.  Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause would not 
seem to turn on such matters of timing or potential loss aversion.
181
  The 
federal government’s solution would have the perverse consequence of 
subjecting to heightened scrutiny only the laws of those states that have done 
the most to protect same-sex couples short of recognizing same-sex 
marriage.  While there is certainly more to be said about those two rationales, 
standing does seem like the legally preferred way for the Justices to have 
addressed concerns about backlash. 
For better or for worse, Justice Kennedy does not appear to be as troubled 
by such concerns as some of his colleagues.  He is the greatest believer in 
judicial supremacy on a Court of judicial supremacists.  For example, in 
explaining why the Court had jurisdiction to hear Windsor notwithstanding 
the President’s determination that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, 
he wrote that “if the Executive’s agreement with a plaintiff that a law is 
unconstitutional is enough to preclude judicial review, then the Supreme 
Court’s primary role in determining the constitutionality of a law that has 
inflicted real injury on a plaintiff who has brought a justiciable legal claim 
would become only secondary to the President’s.”182  “This,” he wrote, 
“would undermine the clear dictate of the separation-of-powers principle that 
‘when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution, ‘[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.’’”183  Justice Scalia deemed “jaw-dropping”184 such a robust law 
declaration, as opposed to dispute resolution, conception of the scope of the 
Court’s interpretive authority.185  True, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined all of Kennedy’s opinion, including that part.  
                                                 
178 See supra note 162 (quoting the opinion of the Ninth Circuit). 
179 See supra note 163 (quoting the brief of the Solicitor General). 
180 See supra text accompanying note 165. 
181 See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 283-286, 300-309 (2011) (discussing 
the concept of loss aversion, according to which people would pay more not to lose an item they value 
than they would to obtain it in the first place). 
182 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013).   
183 Id. at 2688 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427-28 (2012) (quoting Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803))).    
184 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
185 For a discussion of those two models of judicial review, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 72-76 (6th ed. 2009). 
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But it seems unlikely that any of them would have included such an assertion 
had the pen been in their hands.   
Rather than focusing only on Justice Kennedy, a better explanation of 
why the Windsor Court used federalism as a way station is that one or more 
of the Court’s more liberal Justices also do not want a final judicial 
resolution just yet.  And they may not want a final judicial resolution just yet 
because, in their view, the nation is not ready for one, and because imposing 
it prematurely would do more harm than good—to the Court, to the country, 
and to constitutional values that they deem worthy of judicial protection.  
“Judicial statesmanship means that judges must seek not only the ‘right 
answer’ to legal questions as a matter of professional reason but also an 
answer that sustains the social legitimacy of law.”186  In conditions of 
cultural conflict, maintaining social solidarity and sustaining the social 
legitimacy of law may require judges, for the time being, partially to validate 
the sincerely held moral beliefs of both sides—or, at least, not to entirely 
invalidate the convictions of one side.
187
  Assuming some responsibility to 
mediate social tension over same-sex marriage, and perceiving the need to 
take some account of the conditions of their own public legitimacy, certain 
Justices may decide that the best course is to delay a decisive resolution. 
 
IV. OBJECTIONS 
 
The Part anticipates and responds to three potential objections to the 
foregoing analysis of Windsor.  First, it may seem contradictory to argue on 
the one hand that the Court’s opinion is better read on balance as turning on 
equal protection reasoning (“ordinary” evidence of animus) than on 
federalism reasoning (“extraordinary” evidence of animus), and on the other 
hand that the opinion uses federalism as a way station and so lacks full 
transparency.  If one can discern through close textual analysis what an 
opinion is better read as turning on, then ultimately there may not be any lack 
of transparency in the eyes of sufficiently sophisticated readers.   
Recall, however, that this Article does not fully embrace an equality 
reading of the majority opinion.  Instead, the Article stresses the limits of 
such a reading and ultimately concludes that the opinion resists any decisive 
                                                 
186 Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 979 (2008). 
187 See id. at 987-88; Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme 
Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 922 (1983) (admiring 
Justice Powell’s controlling opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978), because it “both symbolically and actually recognized the legitimacy of deeply held moral 
claims on both sides”); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 76 (2003) (observing that in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), the Court 
“intervene[d] into a fierce controversy within constitutional culture about the legitimacy of affirmative 
action in a way that recognize[d] and legitimate[d] concerns on both sides of the dispute”). 
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interpretation.  Put differently, the claim is that an equality reading better 
accounts for more of the Court’s reasoning and rhetoric than does a 
federalism reading, but that neither reading accounts for all of the evidence. 
If this Article had fully embraced an equality reading, then the objection 
under consideration would have great force to the extent that all readers are 
sophisticated consumers of judicial opinions.  It seems unlikely, however, 
that such is the case.  For better or for worse, the sophistication of the reader 
may partially determine the relative transparency or opacity of judicial 
speech.  It has often been observed that judicial opinions, like political 
rhetoric, may mean different things to different audiences.
188
  “The 
distinction between what the Court says to the public about what it is doing 
and what scholars say to one another about what it is doing must be held 
firmly in mind,” political scientist Martin Shapiro once remarked in offering 
an unblinking appreciation of the realities of judicial practice.
189
  “The 
politician is not usually asked to speak the language of political science or 
condemned for not doing so” (id.). 
In any event, this Article is interested in what the Court was intending to 
accomplish in Windsor, not whether it has succeeded.  The Court sometimes 
seems to make statements that presuppose a lack of sophistication on the part 
of the general public.  For example, there seems no better way to explain the 
unpersuasive ways in which majority opinions sometimes “distinguish” 
precedents that the Court wants to ignore but not expressly overrule. 
Turning to the second objection, a skeptic might insist that the Court is 
not necessarily using federalism as a way station just because the presence of 
federalism reasoning and rhetoric in a majority opinion clouds what would 
otherwise have been a clearer legal analysis.  On that view, seemingly odd 
federalism analyses may show up in judicial opinions for any number of 
reasons. 
That observation is doubtless true, but the foregoing argument is 
consistent with it.  This Article claims that a logically unnecessary or 
unconvincing federalism analysis in a majority opinion may indicate the use 
of federalism as a way station—especially when the culture and the legal 
system are in a time of transition regarding the issue under consideration.  
The Article does not claim that a federalism analysis is necessarily playing 
such a role whenever the Court deploys it in questionable ways.   
For example, Massachusetts v. EPA (549 U.S. 497 (2007)) was another 
recent case in which Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s four liberal Justices 
at the time (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).  The question presented 
was whether Massachusetts had Article III standing to challenge the position 
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that it lacked statutory 
                                                 
188 For citations to relevant discussions, see infra notes 190-193.    
189 Shapiro, supra note 158, at 601. 
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authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles (id. 
505, 518).  Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens answered that question 
affirmatively, in part because of “Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its 
quasi-sovereign interests,” which meant that “the Commonwealth is entitled 
to special solicitude in our standing analysis” (id. 520).  The Court’s 
invocation of federalism appeared to be a one-off rejection of EPA’s 
assertion that it lacked authority to regulate global warming, not a way 
station to anything else.  Because the four liberal Justices likely would have 
upheld the standing of a private party to challenge EPA’s position, the 
Court’s references to federalism appeared designed to attract Justice 
Kennedy’s vote. 
That last observation—about who is more or less likely to be attracted to 
federalism language when Kennedy joins the four liberal Justices—is related 
to a third objection to the reading of Windsor offered in this Article.  
According to that objection, there is a contradiction between Justice 
Kennedy’s apparent preference to “bite the bullet” in Hollingsworth instead 
of temporizing, and the argument of this Article that federalism was playing 
a temporizing role in Windsor.  Why would Kennedy want to temporize with 
federalism language in Windsor if he did not want to temporize in 
Hollingsworth?   
One way to dissolve the asserted contradiction is to insist that the Court 
is a “they,” not an “it,” so that Justices other than Kennedy wanted the 
temporizing federalism language in the Windsor majority opinion.  But, the 
objection insists, it is implausible to suppose that Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
or Kagan—the most plausible candidates to want to temporize given their 
votes in Hollingsworth—wanted Kennedy to include the federalism language 
in his Windsor opinion, just as it is implausible to suppose that Kennedy 
included the federalism language just to secure their votes.  Reliance on 
federalism reasoning and rhetoric is characteristic of Kennedy’s approach to 
judging; it is not characteristic of the approaches of Ginsburg, Breyer, or 
Kagan.   
Under those circumstances, how is one to account for the genesis and 
motivations of the federalism language in the Windsor majority opinion?  
According to the objection under consideration, it is more likely that the 
federalism language was included because it was central to Kennedy’s 
reasoning than because it was playing the role of a temporizing way station.  
Indeed, there is abundant evidence that Kennedy genuinely does care a lot 
about various federalism doctrines. 
Several responses to this objection are warranted.  First, it may be 
mistaken to assume that Kennedy was not interested in temporizing in 
Windsor.  As noted in Part III.D, he questioned whether the Court should 
have granted certiorari in Hollingsworth, and although he appeared to prefer 
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to decide the merits than to endorse a standing analysis that he found 
unpersuasive and harmful across a range of subject matters, he likely would 
have tried to decide Hollingsworth narrowly—perhaps by embracing the 
Ninth Circuit’s one-state solution notwithstanding its analytical problems.  In 
other words, the inference that he had already committed himself to going 
“all the way” in Hollingsworth likely overreads the meaning of his dissent in 
that case.   
Second, while some of the federalism language in the Windsor majority 
opinion temporized, other federalism language in the opinion seemed 
designed to encourage challenges to state bans on same-sex marriage.  
Specifically, the emphasis on state control over domestic relations served a 
temporizing function, as did the assertion of “extraordinary” animus.  But the 
several qualifications to state control over domestic relations that he included 
in the opinion sent a very different message, as did the particular way in 
which he deployed federalism in the service of living constitutionalism.  It is 
plausible—indeed, likely—that Kennedy and the liberal Justices shared the 
general objective of both temporizing and encouraging in Windsor.  (Hence 
the absence of concurring opinions or concurrences in the judgment.)  On 
balance, Kennedy’s invocations of federalism, like his use of the language of 
rational basis review, accomplished the majority’s apparent goal of fueling 
challenges to state bans on same-sex marriage without committing federal 
and state courts to invalidating all of them at this time. 
This does not mean the liberal Justices insisted that Kennedy put the 
federalism language in the opinion, or that he focused on federalism in 
particular just in order to attract their votes.  More likely, it means that all of 
the Justices in the majority had the same general ends in mind.  It also likely 
means that Kennedy used federalism reasoning and rhetoric as one particular 
means (among others) to achieve those ends because he is personally 
attracted to federalism frames, and because the ways in which he used those 
frames were sufficiently congenial on balance to the Justices whose votes he 
required.   
Time may tell.  If the Court upholds state bans on same-sex marriage in 
the years ahead, then the interpretation offered here will have been decisively 
falsified.  If the Court invalidates state bans, and in doing so invokes as 
partial authority the results of the litigation and legislation around the 
country that the majority contributed to inspiring in Windsor, then it will 
seem less probable that the Court’s opinion in Windsor was limited to 
Section 3 of DOMA and more probable that its various invocations of 
federalism were doing other work.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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This Article has offered a reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in 
United States v. Windsor.  That reading views the majority opinion as 
combining equal protection reasoning with the analytical and rhetorical 
resources of federalism both to self-consciously lean in the direction of 
marriage equality and to not yet embrace it entirely.  If persuasive, the 
interpretation offered here raises difficult normative questions about whether 
and when the Court’s uses of federalism as a way station are consistent with 
judicial role.
190
  On the one hand, a lack of judicial transparency may corrode 
the integrity of the Court’s conversation with the country.  Just as 
Southerners eventually accused Senator Stephen Douglas of deception in 
touting popular sovereignty as the best solution to the controversy over 
slavery in the territories,
191
 so many defenders of state bans on same-sex 
marriage may come to feel misled by the Windsor Court if it invalidates 
those bans on equal protection or substantive due process grounds.  On the 
other hand, there may be times when full transparency wars with other 
pressing concerns.  Those concerns may include maintaining political 
legitimacy and some measure of social cohesion amidst intense cultural 
disagreement—concerns that may be present even though the union is not 
threatened with dissolution.
192
  Those concerns may also include doing one’s 
judicial best to vindicate constitutional values in a fallen world that is not yet 
prepared to fully recognize them. 
Rather than aim to resolve such questions, this Article has sought to 
clarify the processes of constitutional change by identifying the potential role 
of invocations of federalism in those processes.  The most interesting 
theoretical point about Windsor may be its uses of federalism as both a 
Bickelian passive virtue and an enabling device—as a way station toward 
greater equality for same-sex couples and their children.  Just as politicians 
may invoke federalism values because they are not yet ready to take a 
decisive stand on a divisive issue at the national level, so too may Justices 
temporarily avail themselves of federalism’s temporizing and facilitating 
functions in nudging the country in a certain direction.  Federalism reasoning 
and rhetoric, like declining to announce the level of scrutiny and appearing to 
misapply the justiciability doctrines, may make the difference between a 
nudge and a shove.  But the federalism approach—because it may not only 
                                                 
190 For discussions of some of the relevant normative considerations, see generally Robert C. Post 
& Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and 
the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1973 (2007) (analyzing the law/politics 
distinction in constitutional adjudication); Siegel, supra note 69 (conceptualizing statesmanship and 
partisanship as distinct ways in which judges may act “politically”). 
191 See text following note 137 (discussing eventual Southern hostility to ambiguities in the 
meaning of Senator Stephen Douglas’s doctrine of popular sovereignty). 
192 See generally Siegel, supra note 186 (defending the practice of judicial statesmanship while 
acknowledging its potential perils). 
19-May-14 FEDERALISM AS A WAY STATION 59 
 
 
restrain but also enable—may prove a stronger nudge than the use of those 
other devices.   
Viewed only at the time of decision, judicial opinions issued when 
doctrine is in motion may include analyses that seem logically unnecessary, 
less than fully convincing, and unlikely to decide many future cases.  But 
viewed as part of a conversation between the Court and the country,
193
 the 
shape of opinions during transition periods may reveal not only their reason 
for being, but also the location of the station beyond the way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
193 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1970) 
(“Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of conversations between 
the Court and the people and their representatives.”). 
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